🚨 THE FINAL $OPEN BULL THESIS THE GREAT $OPEN DISLOCATION When price, ownership and fundamentals stop telling the same story. I’ve rarely seen this many conflicting forces building inside one stock at the same time. Forget the daily candles. Look at the math underneath $OPEN. 1/ INSTITUTIONS Q1 institutional shares: ~455.6M Q2: ~567.8M +112.2M shares in ONE quarter. +24.6% QoQ. Ownership: 49.1% → 58.8%. 228 institutions increased positions vs 83 that reduced. Largest additions: BlackRock +54.3M State Street +15.8M Geode +12.6M Morgan Stanley +12.4M Sixth Street +10.3M Top 5 alone: ~105.4M shares — ~94% of net Q2 institutional accumulation. 2/ SHORT INTEREST Mar 31: 123.4M Jun 30: 182.6M Aug 31: 208.1M +84.7M shares since March. +68.7%. Q2 institutional net accumulation alone equals ~54% of the ENTIRE current short position. The top-5 institutional additions equal ~51%. BlackRock’s increase alone equals ~26%. That does NOT mean those shares are locked. But it shows the scale of the two opposing forces. 3/ THE EXIT DOOR Days-to-cover: Mar 31: 3.63 Aug 31: 6.68 +84%. At ~31.2M average daily volume: 25% short covering ≈52M shares ≈1.7 trading days of average volume. 50% ≈104M shares ≈3.3 days. The short book got larger while the relative exit door got smaller. 4/ SUPPLY Opendoor then retired 45.3M shares at $3.49, spending $158M. That’s ~5% of shares outstanding. 45.3M shares = ~22% of current reported short interest. Institutional Q2 accumulation + company retirement: 112.2M + 45.3M = 157.5M shares. That is ~76% of current short interest IN SCALE. Not “locked float.” Not a squeeze guarantee. But an enormous number relative to the short book. 5/ PRICE DISLOCATION Russell 3000 inclusion day: 171.7M shares traded. Close: $4.37. Company buyback: $3.49/share. Using $2.56 as the reference price: $3.49 = +36% $4.37 = +71% These are NOT price targets. They simply show how far the equity has fallen below two recent, observable capital-flow reference points. 6/ THE BUSINESS And this is not happening while operations are collapsing. Q2: Revenue +23% QoQ Contribution Profit +59% Contribution Margin +140 bps QoQ Homes purchased +77% QoQ / +149% YoY 6,908 acquisition contracts on only $5M of marketing spend. Operations expense per acquisition close: $8.4K → $5.0K → $3.0K. Homes listed >120 days: Opendoor: 9% Market: 27%. Even after the August slowdown, management still guided to: Revenue +10–15% YoY Contribution Profit +70–75% Contribution Margin 3.2–3.5% 7/ THE EQUATION Institutional ownership ↑ Share count ↓ Short interest ↑ Days-to-cover ↑ Operating efficiency ↑ Price ↓↓ THAT is the divergence. A falling stock is NOT automatically bullish. But when price moves in the opposite direction from ownership, supply and operating variables, you get ASYMMETRY. The next Q3 13Fs matter enormously. If institutions materially sold, the thesis weakens. But if ownership stayed near ~59% — or increased again — while 208M shares remain short and the company has reduced supply? Then this setup becomes much harder to dismiss as “just another falling stock.” That’s what I’m watching. Not the candles. The equation underneath them. $OPEN @nejatian @rabois @ericjackson @mikealfred @MrAlwaysRugged @mudirshin @MrNeverSell @GMN_watch @urbnsteezus @chuckd1234567 @theopendoorguy #ARMY

$OPEN — This mortgage reform matters more for Opendoor than it might seem 👀 Bill Pulte just confirmed another important change to the U.S. mortgage infrastructure: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are moving toward a single unified pricing grid for Classic FICO and VantageScore 4.0. Why should Opendoor investors care? Because Opendoor is no longer simply an iBuyer. The company is building an increasingly integrated transaction: Sell → Buy → Finance → Close And Opendoor Home Loans sits directly inside that funnel. The introduction of VantageScore 4.0 alongside Classic FICO potentially gives lenders another way to evaluate borrowers. For some consumers, the alternative scoring model can produce a different credit assessment and potentially better loan-level pricing. That matters because one of the biggest friction points in housing isn’t simply finding a buyer. It’s getting that buyer financed and through closing. For Opendoor, therefore, the potential benefit isn’t limited to generating more mortgage revenue. The bigger strategic effect could be: More eligible borrowers → higher mortgage conversion → more completed home purchases → faster inventory turnover → more efficient capital recycling. And this arrives at a particularly interesting moment. Opendoor Home Loans exited beta this month and is expanding beyond financing Opendoor-owned homes. Opendoor previously reported that in Colorado it expected Home Loans to finance more than half of scheduled resale closings, while Texas was already approaching 1 in 5 after only six weeks. That tells us something important: Mortgage penetration is becoming increasingly relevant to the economics of the entire Opendoor ecosystem. Imagine two identical potential buyers. One receives unattractive economics under Classic FICO. The other scoring framework produces a better credit profile and makes the transaction economically viable. For a traditional lender, that’s potentially another mortgage. For Opendoor, it can potentially be another mortgage AND another home sold. That’s the difference. This reform doesn’t magically lower mortgage rates, and we shouldn’t pretend it does. Treasury yields, MBS spreads and funding costs remain the dominant forces determining overall mortgage rates. But it could remove friction from the credit → mortgage → closing pipeline. And for a company attempting to vertically integrate the entire home transaction, even relatively small improvements in conversion can compound across thousands of transactions. The metric I want to watch now isn’t the headline mortgage rate. It’s: Home Loans attach rate × approval/conversion rate × resale volume. If those numbers start moving together, the mortgage business stops being just an additional revenue stream. It becomes infrastructure for increasing the efficiency of the entire Opendoor machine. That’s the real $OPEN angle here. @nejatian @rabois @Opendoor @pulte

@nejatian — one question. You already told me that you’re currently not allowed to buy $OPEN because of the applicable trading-window restrictions. So let me ask you this hypothetically: If, at the next open trading window, $OPEN were still trading around these levels — would you personally consider increasing your exposure? I think your answer would be very interesting. 👀

ALL IN. $OPEN 🔥 There it is. Another 20,000 shares added. In my analysis, this break below $2.50 is a FAKEOUT — not a breakdown. I’ve done the work. I’ve studied the data. And for me, this is the moment. No more watching from the sidelines. The position just got serious. LONG $OPEN 🟢 Now let the thesis play out. ⏳ @rabois @nejatian @ericjackson @mikealfred

🚨 THE GREAT OIL PRICE FRAUD? I spent hours cross-checking EIA, IEA, OPEC, European Commission data and SEC filings. The conclusion is uncomfortable: The deterioration in observable physical oil availability does not come close to explaining the magnitude of the 2026 price explosion. I am NOT alleging illegal manipulation. I am asking a measurable question: Does the physical scarcity actually justify the price? On July 3, Brent traded at $68.68. By September 15: $130.80 — almost +90% in 74 days. Now look at U.S. inventories. 🇺🇸 Commercial crude July 3: 411.4M barrels Sept. 18: 426.4M ➡️ +15M barrels / +3.7% Brent almost doubled. Crude inventories did NOT collapse. They increased. 🇺🇸 Distillates July 3: 103.6M barrels Sept. 18: 107.4M ➡️ +3.7% And after normalizing inventories for actual consumption: • crude days-of-cover improved • distillate coverage improved ~8% • gasoline coverage was roughly flat Composite physical coverage: +~4% Brent: +74% by Sept. 18 almost +90% at the peak Price exploded while physical coverage improved. Now Europe. 🇪🇺 EU-14 + UK + Norway crude inventories: 421.9M barrels That was: +1.9% ABOVE the five-year average. Total petroleum products were ~4.9% below their 5-year average. Middle distillates: ~5.3% below. Tight? Yes. Empty? No. And on Sept. 8 the European Commission stated: “There is no supply problem in the EU at the present time.” Now look at the famous global inventory draw. The IEA reports roughly 507M barrels of observed global inventory losses since February. But in August alone: 🌍 Global inventories: −95M 🚢 Oil on water: −65M 🌏 Non-OECD: −52M 🏭 OECD: +23M Read that again: OECD inventories actually INCREASED by 23M barrels. So the crisis is not simply: “There is no oil.” It is heavily about: shipping, routes, insurance, refining constraints, regional dislocations, exports and geopolitical risk. Those are real. But they are not the same thing as physical inventories collapsing. Private industry tells a similar story. PBF Energy reports actual physical hydrocarbon barrels: June 2022: 34.2M barrels June 2026: 34.0M barrels Difference: −0.6%. Practically identical. Meanwhile, Western oil intensity has also structurally fallen. EVs alone were already displacing around 1.7M barrels/day of global oil demand by 2025, before adding efficiency, biofuels and wider electrification. So absolute inventories alone are not enough. The real question is: How many days of actual demand can those inventories cover? Same July→September window: 2008 Brent: −35% Physical coverage: +~8% 2022 Brent: −25% Physical coverage: +~8% 2026 Brent: +74% Physical coverage: +~4% At the peak, Brent was almost +90%. That is the anomaly. Diesel is even more striking. From early July to September: U.S. distillate stocks: +3.7% Distillate days-of-cover: +~8% Yet NY Harbor diesel spot: +~61% This does NOT mean there is zero tightness. It means: The price acceleration is dramatically larger than the deterioration in observable physical availability. The market is not pricing only the barrels sitting in tanks. It is pricing the marginal next barrel: shipping, Hormuz risk, insurance, replacement cost, refinery constraints and immediate availability. And once that marginal barrel becomes extremely expensive, hundreds of millions of barrels already sitting in tanks, terminals, pipelines and company inventories are repriced against it. Those barrels did not disappear. Yet consumers pay the new scarcity price. THE GREAT OIL PRICE FRAUD? Not necessarily an illegal fraud. But a pricing mechanism that deserves far more scrutiny. The question is simple: How much of today’s oil price is actually explained by physical scarcity — and how much is not? Sources: EIA, IEA, OPEC, European Commission, SEC filings. What am I missing? #wti #oil #brent #inflation @DeItaone @KobeissiLetter @wallstengin @aeberman12

🚨 FORMAL SEC FILING SUBMITTED — POSSIBLE $OPEN MARKET MANIPULATION As I promised, I followed this all the way through. With the support of my legal counsel, the full dossier regarding the unusual trading activity observed in Opendoor Technologies ($OPEN) has now been formally submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC has confirmed receipt. The submission includes the underlying datasets, order-level analysis, cross-venue comparisons, event timelines, counter-evidence, methodology and the specific patterns that I believe warrant independent regulatory review. To be absolutely clear: I am not claiming that manipulation has already been proven. That is precisely why the material is now where it belongs — with the authorities that have access to information retail investors do not, including the ability to reconstruct order activity and identify the entities behind it. I was genuinely pleased to see @rabois acknowledge my previous analysis. @nejatian , I also want to say this with genuine respect: I have a great deal of confidence in what you are trying to build at Opendoor, and I fully understand that your position as CEO places obvious limits on what you can appropriately say about a matter like this. I simply hope this concern has reached you. I see you as an important figure not only in Opendoor’s transformation, but also in representing the long-term interests of its shareholders. Precisely because I respect your leadership, I hope Opendoor will support any appropriate regulatory review and cooperate fully should the authorities decide that these patterns deserve a deeper examination. This has never been about creating noise around the company. Quite the opposite. If there is nothing improper here, an independent review can help establish that clearly. If there is something improper, shareholders deserve to know. Either outcome serves the same principle: market integrity and shareholder protection. I did my part. The evidence is now in regulatory hands. $OPEN

LONG $OPEN

👀

🚨 $OPEN — POSSIBLE ALGORITHMIC MARKET MANIPULATION. @nejatian — I am addressing this directly to you as CEO of Opendoor. After weeks of forensic work on $OPEN trading, I believe our findings justify review by Opendoor, Nasdaq, FINRA and potentially the SEC. As an $OPEN shareholder, I can provide the complete dataset, order IDs, timestamps, code and methodology. We reconstructed ~2.23 MILLION individual orders across Nasdaq, NYSE Arca, Cboe BZX, EDGX and MEMX, covering ~86% of observed volume: MBO/L3 orders, executions, cancellations, off-exchange trades, auctions, options and short-sale data. Thousands of quantitative tests: regressions, event studies, cross-venue synchronization, market-impact models, VPIN and order-lifecycle reconstruction. The findings raise serious questions about potential algorithmic market manipulation. From Sep 9–17 alone, 14:00–15:00 ET produced −4.94M shares of aggressive net flow, negative in 6/7 sessions. But the key evidence is inside the book. 📍 SEP 9 — 11,200 An 11,200-share SELL executes @ $3.05. Then 335 SELL orders of exactly 11,200 shares appear. 326/335 — 97.3% — disappear within ONE SECOND. After $OPEN trades lower: 🟢 BUY 11,200 @ $3.00 → EXECUTED. SELL → REPEATED SUPPLY → CANCEL → LOWER PRICE → BUY If CAT links these actions to the same beneficial owner/coordinated accounts, regulators can determine whether displayed supply influenced price discovery before a lower execution. 📍 SEP 17 — THE $2.57 WALL 172 SELL orders of exactly 14,500 shares. 167/172 — 97.1% — cancelled within one second. Around 108 identical 14,500-share SELL orders repeatedly appear around $2.57 while genuine selling hits $OPEN. Median lifetime: ~78 MILLISECONDS. Same size. Same price. Appear. Disappear. Repeat. Genuine liquidity — or the appearance of a larger sell wall than actually intended for execution? 📍 SEP 24 — THE CLOSE Nasdaq SELL imbalance jumps: 354K → 970K → 1.17M shares in ~20 seconds. At virtually the same time, selling appears across ALL FIVE exchanges. Around 15:54:40 ET, in ~ONE SECOND: 🔴 ~134,060 aggressively SOLD 🟢 ~810 aggressively BOUGHT ~165 : 1 Nasdaq. Arca. EDGX. BZX. MEMX. The five venues finish at approximately −822K shares of identified aggressive net flow. ⸻ THESE ARE ONLY EXAMPLES. Across the five-exchange sample: 🔴 38,076 large fleeting SELL orders 🔴 ~353M shares of cumulatively displayed sell liquidity A stricter test — 5,000+ share orders appearing before an opposite-side execution and cancelled within 50ms — identified: 68,524 SELL-side candidate sequences vs 49,769 BUY-side = 18,755 more SELL occurrences. We also tested thresholds down to 5 milliseconds. These totals alone don’t prove manipulation; high-frequency activity exists on both sides. But the specific fingerprints come from tens of thousands of order/cancellation sequences and deserve account-level investigation. WE DOCUMENTED: • persistent aggressive selling • identical non-round SELL orders • 97%+ cancellation rates in specific fingerprints • lifetimes measured in milliseconds • apparent sell walls • auction imbalances • simultaneous cross-exchange selling These patterns overlap with spoofing/layering when non-bona-fide liquidity creates misleading supply/demand while genuine transactions obtain an economic advantage. The decisive question: WHO controlled these orders? Public data cannot answer it. The Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) can. @nejatian , I hope you and @Opendoor take this seriously. I can provide the entire analysis and dataset immediately. If Opendoor does not act, on Monday, as an @Opendoor shareholder, I intend through legal counsel to submit the prepared documentation directly to the SEC and appropriate regulators for independent review and to protect Opendoor shareholders’ interests. The data, order IDs, timestamps and anomalies exist. Now they deserve to be investigated. @rabois @ericjackson @mikealfred

I’m sure @nejatian has thought through this carefully. A buyback at these levels could look attractive on paper, but cash also has to support inventory growth, mortgages, operations, and whatever opportunities management sees ahead. Sometimes the best capital allocation decision is not the most obvious one from the outside. If @nejatian believes $OPEN is materially undervalued and the balance sheet can comfortably support it, I would love to see another disciplined buyback. But I also think he is looking several moves ahead, not just at today’s share price.

Alright, fuck it. I’m tired of waiting for $2.50. Today looks like a good enough opportunity. I’m adding 17,500 more shares of $OPEN $44,625. I’ve done the research. I know the risk. I know what I own. Now let’s see how this plays out. I’m in. LONG $OPEN

@nejatian , I know I keep pushing you on this — but I genuinely think the numbers make the question worth asking again. $OPEN bought back 45.3M shares at $3.49, spending $158M. At ~$2.58, buying back the exact same 45.3M shares would cost only ~$117M — about $41M less than the first buyback. Opendoor had $896M in cash at Q2-end and subsequently added ~$440M of net growth capital — roughly $1.34B pro forma before Q3 cash movements. Another 45.3M-share buyback at today’s price would require less than 9% of that pro-forma cash, leaving roughly $1.22B before Q3 movements. Same number of shares retired. Far less capital required. And beyond the economics, I think it would send an important signal to shareholders. We are not just people watching a ticker — we are owners of this company. Many of us have continued supporting Opendoor, its team and this turnaround through a very difficult period. If the balance sheet allows it and management believes the shares are undervalued, another disciplined buyback could both create value for the company and give some relief to the shareholders who have stood behind it. I know I’m stressing you with this question, Kaz 😅 — but I think those shareholders deserve to have it seriously considered. @rabois @morganb @Opendoor

My buy order at $2.50 is still valid LONG $OPEN