This because of the current session of the UN General Assembly where #Iran does not want to appear as attacker

The more oil that leaves the more fees Iran can charge .

Actually if panels become cheap enough you curtail them as a variable control

The conditions haven't changed and are unacceptable to both sides. Are we really going to do this "a deal is imminent" dance again? Is it Friday?

Saudi built the East-West pipeline and Fujairah STS capacity for precisely this contingency. Combine that with the Gulf loading surge and the chokepoint thesis no longer holds. The volumes settle it.

This has just begun

Why tf should we believe them when they have never yet told us the truth? Only a fool would do so.

As long as they can keep diesel where it is now and bond markets in the state they are I’m not sure crude and Brent fluctuations, which are manipulated too btw will be enough for them to escalate significantly. We’re paying the extra costs for the tankers anyway

Hey genius where all that oil going?

This report is particularly important because it highlights something that is often overlooked: there is no real consensus within the GCC over how to deal with Iran. One might have expected a common threat to produce a common Gulf strategy. Instead, the current crisis is once again exposing significant differences among the Gulf states. The Saudi and Emirati approach could prove to be a dangerous gamble. The assumption appears to be that sustained external pressure, combined with growing pressure inside Iran, will eventually force Tehran to compromise. But that outcome is far from certain. Domestic pressure may not produce Iranian restraint or capitulation. It could instead encourage Tehran to take greater risks, escalate against its adversaries, and shift some of the costs of the confrontation onto the Gulf states themselves. The larger problem is that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may still be dealing with Iran as if it were the Iran of before the war. Under Ali Khamenei, there was at least an argument that overwhelming pressure could affect Tehran’s calculations and encourage caution. But what I call “Iran 3.0” is a different system: one in which the IRGC plays a much more dominant role and a new, more radical and less experienced leadership faces enormous internal and external pressure. Under these circumstances, escalation rather than capitulation may increasingly become Tehran’s preferred response. This creates a genuine dilemma for the Gulf states. An Iran-Oman arrangement that effectively gives Tehran a significant role in the security architecture of the Strait of Hormuz would be extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to accept. Yet preventing Iran from gaining such a foothold also carries serious risks. Without some arrangement that gives Tehran a stake in reopening and stabilizing the Strait, the probability of further escalation could rise substantially. The policy lines are therefore understandable, but they are also extremely dangerous. Washington and its Gulf partners should be careful about assuming that additional pressure will automatically produce additional Iranian restraint. Against the Iran that is emerging from this war, pressure without a credible diplomatic off-ramp could produce exactly the opposite result. And if that happens, Saudi Arabia and the UAE may be among the first to discover that a strategy designed to contain Iran can quickly boomerang against the Gulf itself. Iran appears willing to return to a more regulated and stable framework, but only on the basis of full implementation of the existing memorandum of understanding. From Tehran’s perspective, this is not the starting point for a new negotiation; it is the baseline for restoring the previous framework. The key point is that there is little reason to assume that additional pressure, by itself, will force Iran to retreat from these core demands. Tehran seems to believe that it has already made the concessions it was prepared to make and that the next step must be implementation of what was previously agreed. This is the reality we need to confront. More pressure may increase the costs for Iran, but higher costs do not necessarily translate into greater flexibility. If Tehran concludes that Washington is trying to rewrite the understandings through coercion, the more likely Iranian response may be escalation rather than additional concessions. The choice, therefore, is not simply between pressure and diplomacy. The real question is whether there is still a viable path back to the existing framework, and, if not, how both sides intend to manage the growing risk of escalation. #IranWar‌ #iran

White House aide Peter Navarro tells Steve Bannon “we’ll be essentially rare earth magnet independent within 6, 12, 18 months,” may even be able to export abroad Bannon: That’s impossible Navarro: It’s not impossible

Latest Hormuz oil flow run shows more than 13.5 MMbpd clearing the Strait as of yesterday on a 7dma (and as regular readers will know, day-ago numbers are usually an undercount) By far the biggest rise has come from Saudi Arabia's new Gulf loadings blitz. (Data via Kpler)

Do you say that because it lacks the necessary calorific value? Or because it's a logistical nightmare? Thanks in advance for your feedback Sir

What about the nuclear weapons grade material the Israeli intelligence are saying its a thing again with activities at Pickaxe Mountain..

What do you think about the RDF Refuse Derived Fuel as an alternative for this industry and waste problem?

Sublime and brimstone offer alternative limestone chemistries as well as electrified processing. This could in theory be powered by renewables including solar. These pathways are still early stage and might or not be suitable for developing markets. But alternatives are possible

that's the manipulated paper market art, what about the cash price?

imagine we have thrown everything at the #oil market the last 2 weeks and it is only at $100/bbl. brent max.. what does that tell you?