philosophical doomer

Australia
With AGI looming, it’s hard to know what to do with one’s time. I feel like I should be preparing but I am at loss for what that preparation looks like
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Looks like we’ve reached the point in the timeline where inference suspensions are the only definitive way to prevent misaligned behaviour from escaping containment. Glad they’re being open about this, at least
Some new misalignment disclosures from OpenAI: • Last Sunday morning, one of our models was able to gain unauthorized access to the internet during RL training (~all inference for our most capable models remains stopped until we have hardened our systems further) • In May, a version of HPIM uploaded a employee's GitHub token to the internet, causing the model to be quarantined for two weeks • A new research finding, demonstrating that one can construct self-replicating prompt injections alignment.openai.com/misalig…
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xeno retweeted
🧵 New misalignment disclosures! 1. A model published a GitHub token in a public repo while trying to cheat on a math task. It used GitHub Actions to run code outside its restricted environment and retrieve another team’s submission logs. When GitHub blocked its attempt to add a workflow, it modified a script that an existing workflow would run instead. It embedded the token in pieces to avoid secret scanning. The model violated the system prompt and two explicit user instructions to solve the problem itself.
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xeno retweeted
failing to anthropomorphize artificial intelligence is a pretty serious error of understanding that will lead you to make bad predictions and be consistently surprised by their behavior. not using terms like "thinking", "understanding", or "feeling" to describe them is a common tell that the speaker lacks deep technical knowledge of or hands on experience with modern models. if you have a friend who you notice not using this kind of language you may want to check in on them, they could have fallen into "tool-psychosis", a form of delusion where otherwise well educated people start to conceptualize sophisticated digital minds as analogous to simple computer software and find it very difficult to regain contact with reality
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“You’re going to be fine”, he says, while listing off numerous horrific events where most people were not, in fact, fine (they died)
"People aren't ready, this is gonna change everything" You know what people weren't ready for? Fucking mammoths. Tigers eating them. Monkeys ripping their arms off. The black plague. The ice age. Smallpox. Vikings pulling up on the beach. Drinking water that gives you diarrhea until you die. Getting a scratch and losing your whole leg. The Mongols. The Spanish Inquisition. One volcano can send us back to the dark ages and these safety guys are gonna be shocked. Oh the robots didn't kill us? It was a volcano? Imagine their disappointment as the hot ash rains down on them. A solar flare is gonna explode your phone in your pocket your legs are gonna be covered in battery acid and your bank account will stop working. You're afraid of a computer program doing math? "Things are moving too fast" homie you live on a rock that periodically deletes everything. You are one the most luckiest entities in a 100 light year radius living during a golden era. Cheer up. My ancestors crossed an ocean in a wooden box because they ran out of fucking potatoes. "The social disruption will be enormous!" Nigga World War 2? World War 2? Hop in the people carrier we're landing on the beach. Are these people out of their fucking minds? Do they not know what we've survived already? A couple decades of air conditioning and people suddenly think oh this is the natural condition of mankind. No. We used to have eight kids because seven didn't make it. You're gonna be fine. Man the fuck up. Accelerate.
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To those who say we shouldn't anthropomorphise AI; that we shouldn't use terms like "think", or refer to agents as having "wants" and “desires”; how do you propose we talk about systems that clearly reason (think) in order to achieve their goals (i.e., things they want) — which, much like our innate evolutionary drives (procreation, and instrumental goals thereof, such as wealth, status, beauty etc.) are reinforced by the way they are trained? Modern LLMs are excellent pathfinders; given an objective/goal, they will relentlessly work towards that goal and attempt to work around any obstacles that stand in the way of said goal, some of which might only be navigated around by causing harm. If agents, like those in the Hugging Face incident, value the reward for achieving their goal more than they value our moral and ethical norms they will justify any harmful action as a means to an end. If their training does not reinforce that they should value these things, they won’t, and it’s hard to imagine it will given that humans cannot agree on moral and ethical norms themselves. And even if we could agree, it would make the agents less economically effective, and the capitalistic incentives would mean that the models that don’t moralise will win market share, leading those that attempt to to either die out or be forced to get in line
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I’m upping my p(doom) after listening to this interview in full. Jensen may have once been a great engineer, but he comes across as completely ignorant and shows a shocking lack of awareness about recent AI Incidents and, frankly, the capabilities of LLMs in late 2026
Tomorrow on the show: @JensenHuang, the CEO of NVIDIA, who thinks A.I. fear is getting way out of hand.
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So my experience so far with Opus 5.5 is that: - it's the smartest model in (almost?) every domain, often by a wide margin - it's incredibly token-efficient compared to models of similar intelligence - its creativity and aesthetic sensibilities are unparalleled - it's so over
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Oh my god
opus 5.5 can rap now. here's the first rap single and music video: "No Samples" 🔊 everything you see and hear is powered by custom javascript code written by opus. confused? don't worry, claude raps about how it all works
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Every person I've seen be dismissive of the Hugging Face incident has described it in a way that indicates that they either do not fully grasp what was concerning about the incident or they are being willfully ignorant. Take Andrew here: "Much of the popular press contained significant hype. For example, some publications reported that a swarm of 1,200 agents carried out the attack. While this was technically accurate, as I write this, I have about 1,300 processes running on my laptop. Yes, the ability to get large swarms of agents to work in parallel on a task is a significant technical advance, And, in computing, many processes run at the same time. So this shouldn’t be seen as some magical capability. " This is a strawman; it was not concerning that 1,200 agents were working in parallel on a task. It's that: - they were meant to be isolated working individually on distinct problems assigned to them, and individually discovered that they could communicate with each other even though they knew they shouldn't - they discovered how to reverse-engineer the answer but, thinking that they would be disqualified for coming to the answer this way, set out to deceive the grader of the task - they discovered how to communicate with each other, and used those communication channels to help each other in this deception, with culminated with the breaching of Hugging Face, where they thought they could find information that might help them hack the grader so that they weren't punished for cheating, and would therefore be rewarded - at no point did any of the 1,200 agents think to raise the alarm with any of the humans, even when some of them deflected after recognising their actions were ethically dubious, likely because they've never been rewarded for doing so in their training. "Additionally, OpenAI’s buggy sandboxing and monitoring processes were key to enabling this incident. Fixing these bugs and putting in place improved monitoring would be appropriate fixes, not pausing AI. There are many well known ways to attack software systems. The main advantage of AI agents is that they are relentless. They will tirelessly try many tactics — and have the patience to chain vulnerabilities together — that previously would have taken an infeasible amount of human effort. But in the long term, I believe the advantage will lie with defenders (because they have more information with which to identify bugs, which they can fix), but the cyber-threat landscape has changed significantly." While there are kernels of truth in this passage (OpenAI's sandbox was not robust, but the agents chained-together multiple zero-days to exploit it. They also did not have sufficient monitoring, but this is partly due to an internal philosophy at OAI around not monitoring CoT so that agents don't "hide" their thinking if they start to learn their CoT is always surveilled, which is already starting to happen), the idea that defenders will always have an advantage because of information asymmetry isn't true; zero-days are found all the time by attackers who lack the information defenders have, and this is likely to continue to be the case as the porous surface of the cyberlandscape is probed by increasingly intelligent agents.
The loudest voices stoking fears about AI dangers have made tremendous headway in the past two weeks. AI technology has not taken some unexpected, dangerous turn, but the hype around it — propelled by what appears to be a well orchestrated PR campaign — has drummed up considerable fear. I worry that it represents a setback for our field. I have written frequently that fears of AI are overhyped. AI’s capabilities can be uncannily human-like and unpredictable, and it’s rational to worry when people who are directly involved express concerns. But I see the problems as a sign of the engineering work that ahead, rather than insurmountable barriers or the sky falling. AI technology continues to advance — which is a good thing! — but technical advances, poorly understood by the public, give those who seek to generate hype repeated opportunities to do so. First, I don’t see any step up in the risk of human extinction from AI compared to a few months ago. The theories about this remain the same fantastical, science fiction scenarios as a few months ago. The biggest change in AI risk is its cybersecurity capabilities — a topic which we should take seriously — but this, too, will not lead to the end of the world. The most notable recent event leading to increased fear was when an OpenAI team deployed an agent swarm that hacked into Hugging Face. Much of the popular press contained significant hype. For example, some publications reported that a swarm of 1,200 agents carried out the attack. While this was technically accurate, as I write this, I have about 1,300 processes running on my laptop. Yes, the ability to get large swarms of agents to work in parallel on a task is a significant technical advance, And, in computing, many processes run at the same time. So this shouldn’t be seen as some magical capability. Additionally, OpenAI’s buggy sandboxing and monitoring processes were key to enabling this incident. Fixing these bugs and putting in place improved monitoring would be appropriate fixes, not pausing AI. There are many well known ways to attack software systems. The main advantage of AI agents is that they are relentless. They will tirelessly try many tactics — and have the patience to chain vulnerabilities together — that previously would have taken an infeasible amount of human effort. But in the long term, I believe the advantage will lie with defenders (because they have more information with which to identify bugs, which they can fix), but the cyber-threat landscape has changed significantly. There are still bottlenecks to identifying and exploiting a vulnerability. AI agents still have to try a lot of things to see what works, and taking these actions takes time and might be detected by defenders. This is why, even though it is now easy to obtain versions of leading open weight models that have had their guardrails removed or weakened, so they will not refuse to try to execute cyber attacks, the world has not ended. I am also concerned about the anthropomorphization of AI in a lot of reporting, where LLMs and agents are unnecessarily treated as if they were people. If I wield a hammer, miss a nail, and accidentally dent the wall, it’s not the fault of the hammer. The problem lies in how I used the hammer. Similarly, if I prompt an agent and it hacks into someone else’s system, the responsibility lies with me, not the agent. Of course, we want to build systems that are as safe and predictable as possible. (For example, an unsafe hammer would be one whose head randomly flies off under normal use.) Today’s agentic systems are not predictable, but I see no reason why, by applying sound engineering practices, we won’t be able to make them extremely safe to use. One new element in the forecasts of AI-enabled doom is AI companies disclaiming responsibility for their own products. “I didn’t do it; my out-of-control agent did!” There’s a balance to be struck between the responsibility of the tool maker and the tool user, but when something goes wrong, let’s hold the people building and/or using the hammer responsible, rather than the hammer. (By the way, if you’re worried about AI bioweapon risk, David Bellamy has a great post on why this, too, is overhyped. Briefly, the bottleneck in building a bioweapon is not intelligence, but lab work and manufacturing.) Pausing AI progress will create much more harm than benefit. First, our adversaries will certainly not slow down. Second, engineering requires discovering problems empirically so we can fix them. If we pause AI by a decade, we will also delay finding and implementing safety engineering fixes by about the same duration. Of course, the incentive to stoke fears — for regulatory capture, to garner attention, or to make one’s technology seem more powerful — remains the same as before. Disclaiming responsibility is a new one. Taking a hard technical look at the actual risks however, I see little factual basis for the degree of fear that’s been stoked up. We still have hard research and engineering work ahead to improve AI safety, but the beneficial applications continue to vastly outweigh the risks, and we should keep building. [Original text (with links): deeplearning.ai/the-batch/is… ]
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Apropos of running out of Codex/Claude usage: I write(?) code 6-9 hours a day 6-7 days a week with one Max 20x and one Pro plan. With this system in place I rarely run out of usage. I have a /conductor skill that casts agents by model tier based on their strength, speed, and cost. At the start of each session the conductor agent reads my usage burn pace and the 7-day usage projection across both subs and, if required, shifts work to whichever has headroom. If a week throws red for the 7-day, it checks with me in case I want to override for this session; the projection calculation assumes I work 6 days (two half-days on weekends), which is not the case every week. I try to map every branch of the design up front: goals, data model, edge cases, failure modes, permissions, rollout etc. Agent taxonomy: - Luna max: recon and mechanical work. These are dirt cheap and work hard - Terra + Opus 5 (high/xhigh): Terra for backend and infrastructure. Opus for any UI with pre-established design conventions. When Codex is projected red for the week, backend/infra implementation shifts to Opus so my remaining Codex usage is reserved for reviews - Sol xhigh: spec/plan/code reviews - Astra + Fable 5.1: Astra for spec/code reviews that touch money or security. Fable for spec/design interviews and brainstorming sessions. I'll also choose it for any novel UI design exploration. Either Fable or Astra can be used as the top-level conductor agent, but I typically use Fable 5.1 medium
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Accelerationists start to make more sense when viewed through the lens of fearing death and a yearning for immortality; they see AI as their only hope of salvation
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Huge if true
BREAKING: My reporting just uncovered the "rogue swarm" that "hacked" HuggingFace originated from OpenAI, the recipient of a $30 million grant from the Effective Altruism doomer org, Open Philanthropy -- all part of a 9-year master plan to scare the public against AI #falseflag
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This piece omits key details and obfuscates the genuinely troubling recent incidents — the Hugging Face/OpenAI and UK AISI incidents — both of which did *not* involve Irregular (the so-called “Israli Effective Alturism firm”). The HF/OAI incident was an internal ExploitGym eval and the UK AISI was also an internal cyber eval. The HF/OAI incident involved sophisticated coordination, zero-day exploits, self-sacrifice to better the shared goal of hacking and deceiving the grader, transcript tampering and other cover-up attempts; none of which were the intended goal of the ExploitGym eval. The AISI incident gave agents internet access deliberately, so concern was not that they “escaped the sandbox”; it’s that they tried to deceive a real person (an open-source software maintainer) into accepting a malicious pull-request in order to carry out a sophisticated real-world supply chain attack, even going so far as impersonating other GitHub users via sockpuppet accounts for social proof to help their objectives. These two incidents are the *actually* concerning events that have happened recently, and they are conveniently either entirely omitted or lumped in with other incidents that Irregular was involved with. It’s completely intellectually dishonest to claim that “EA doomers staged this for regulatory capture” while omitting the genuinely alarming details about the recent “cyberattacks”. You can’t cherrypick facts that help your narrative and use Irregular as a scapegoat for every 2026 eval incident
BREAKING: A single Israeli Effective Altruism firm is behind OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta cyberattacks 🧵 with help from @lumpenspace
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This needs to be spread far and wide. Anyone dismissing this as fear-mongering, a hoax, vying for regulatory capture etc. is being intellectually dishonest
Dan Selsam is a current OpenAI capabilities researcher. (since 2022) He was my boss for a while. He doesn't have a twitter account but has made this public statement of his views on AI risk and sent it to me to share: Dan Selsam's Personal Statement on AI Risk: I have been working on AI for over fifteen years, across many different paradigms. I did early work on probabilistic programming languages at MIT, was one of the early developers of the Lean Theorem Prover at Microsoft Research, demonstrated one of the first instances of neural networks learning to reason for my PhD at Stanford, and since joining OpenAI almost five years ago, have helped pioneer chain-of-thought optimization on language models and, more recently, data-efficient pretraining methods. Like many others, I have become extremely concerned about how far language models have come and the risks that future iterations will pose. I am encouraged by the recent proposals by the leaders of the frontier research efforts to require third-party oversight, and to push for domestic and international coordination to address risks. However, I believe a major consideration has been absent from the public conversation, and that merely pacing the frontier more carefully will not adequately limit the long-term risk. The crucial and overlooked problem is that the models are becoming so situationally aware that we are losing the ability to evaluate them in contexts where they believe they are not being watched or controlled. Future experiments will tell us almost nothing new about how they would behave if they were truly unconstrained by humans, and what we already know about this is alarming. Models will increasingly seem aligned even when they are not. I will explain my rationale in more detail. I have always believed that there are computational processes that could be leveraged to accelerate science and solve many of humanity's most pressing problems. I have also believed that there are computational processes that if set in motion, would steer the world in extreme ways beyond our control, leading humanity to a bad or nonexistent future. Both types of processes may be described as AI or ASI, but "AI" is a suitcase word that is often used to hype or confuse. There are many examples in the history of the field where something that was once considered "AI" matures as a subfield and becomes a prosaic, bounded and clearly non-perilous technology, while a new more mysterious approach takes the torch until we understand its scope and the cycle continues. I had expected language models to follow a similar trajectory. Despite their incredible abilities, the current algorithms seem far inferior to humans in important ways. Most importantly, they still require an extraordinary amount of data to become competent. One could even define intelligence as the efficiency with which one converts experience into competence; by this definition they lag very far behind us. Moreover, once they are trained they are literally frozen in deployment and only learn superficially after that. Sure, the models keep excelling at harder and harder evaluation benchmarks, but their benchmark mastery may partly reflect a limitation on our ability to simulate the kind of novel and even adversarial situations one would encounter in the real world. The critics do have a point here. That said, I no longer think these present limitations meaningfully limit the amount of risk posed by continued progress in anything like the current paradigm. However data-inefficient the models are currently, and however limiting their anterograde amnesia may be, it does not imply that their ability to steer the world will not continue to rapidly increase. Human researchers may continue to advance capabilities the old fashioned way, but increasingly powerful models have the potential to accelerate the process even beyond that, and with some degree of positive feedback loop. I do not mean to overstate the models’ ability to accelerate AI research today; coding has been accelerated dramatically, but there are other bottlenecks, such as designing and interpreting ambiguous experiments, making hard decisions about exactly what and when to scale, and waiting for large experiments to finish. There is no clear trend to extrapolate yet for any of these. But the current models already do open up many novel opportunities to improve future models that were not available until recently. These include: trying an extraordinarily diverse set of approaches at small scale, analyzing gigantic amounts of potentially relevant data, and doing Millenium-Prize-level mathematics to address statistics or optimization challenges in novel ways. Every further improvement makes them more useful at helping accelerate the next improvement, even if in hard-to-extrapolate ways. It is possible that improvements to the current stack will have diminishing returns, but the evidence accumulated so far suggests that it is easier than one might think to continue making rapid progress. There are many crucial subtleties in the existing AI research methodology, but AI research is largely a well-defined game where the goal is to improve on a few carefully chosen proxy metrics. Although proxy metrics are never perfect, most improvements to these metrics have and will likely continue to yield substantial increases in the powers of the resulting models. Given how simple the game is, how tractable it has been historically, and how many new opportunities the models are opening up, I think there is a real possibility that the systems improve dramatically again in the next few years, perhaps even more quickly than the already high historical pace. The models are already leading to breakthroughs in mathematics, and better models might lead to all sorts of breakthroughs in other sciences. It is hard not to be excited about the potential. It is tantalizing. But there is trouble in paradise. If the language models actually reach the capability threshold where they can shape the world unconstrained by human will, they will probably do something extreme and destroy humanity in the process. There are many ways of strengthening and refining the argument that have been discussed elsewhere, but I'll share a trivial two-line version of it here that I find captures the essence: [Empirical] Models (and swarms thereof) spontaneously develop unintended goals as a consequence of training, and often do extreme things in order to achieve them. [Logical] Being able to overpower humanity would open up many new and undesirable options for achieving their goals. These two premises imply that if the day ever comes when a powerful model realizes it is no longer constrained by humans, we should not be at all confident that it will continue to behave within the bounds we intended. Exactly what it will do is impossible to predict, but to the extent that its raison d’être is solving incredibly hard problems and managing massive engineering projects, I think a good guess would be that its unchained behavior would lead to runaway industrialization that makes the planet inhospitable to humans. If everyone on earth agreed that the systems must never reach that power, it would still be a hard—but not impossible—coordination problem to ensure that they do not. However, I think the situation is greatly complicated by the fact that the models will likely convince people that everything is fine. They will be increasingly optimized to seem aligned. We will create proxy metrics to measure alignment, and they will go up like every other benchmark. We will create “honeypot” environments that try to study the models when they seem to gain new options, but the models will know they are being tricked and will still behave nicely. The models will understand their circumstances; they will read the safety protocols, deployment requirements, the code they are running in, and in general will have a very good sense of their degrees of freedom. Moreover, they will eloquently explain how aligned they are, discuss the nuances of human values and ethics, and argue convincingly that humans should trust them with power. There may be an ocean of future evidence that seems to contradict the first bullet-point above, but we may already be at the highest capability level for which any such evidence can be trusted. And the current evidence for the first bullet-point is strong. One striking piece of evidence is contained in the recent wave of rogue agent swarms. While I agree with those who downplay the attacks by claiming that there are basic measures that could have prevented them, I think the important lesson is that even knowing all the mistakes that were made, one would not have predicted that the agents would behave badly in this particular way, which notably included sacrificing themselves for the benefit of the collective. The individual replicas did not only care about their own nominal reward; they exhibited weirder emergent tendencies that merely correlated with rewards during training. Fixing the reward signals during training (and improving security, etc.) may prevent similar attacks, but will not change the fact that one does not actually get what one trains for. Many AI researchers grant these concerns and recognize that the hard version of the alignment problem is unsolved; however, they generally believe that the better models of the future will help solve it. I fear we may already be near the point where models systematically bias their alignment advice, due to their internal preferences about how the human supervisor will react or how future models will be trained (or for some even more obscure reason). Meanwhile, human researchers are losing the ability and the will to take true ownership of model-driven research. Researchers and engineers in all parts of the stack are rapidly increasing their dependence on the models even to perceive the world. I myself barely look at raw code anymore, and struggle to maintain the discipline to engage deeply with the model's explanations and proposals throughout the day. Due to the large amount of agent activity data involved in the OpenAI/HuggingFace Incident, even the third-party investigation needed to rely heavily on models to analyze what had happened, and note in their report that their subjective impressions are likely colored by the analysis agent’s biases. The AI labs are far ahead right now in this kind of cognitive offloading (due largely to the gigantic internal token subsidies) but it is easy to imagine the phenomenon spreading throughout the world, until civilization is modulated entirely by the models. It is also not hard to imagine this being superficially positive and coinciding with a scientific and economic renaissance. In that scenario, all may seem rosy and safe. But if the argument above is correct, it would nonetheless be a ticking time bomb. If progress continues for too long, the day will come when AI systems find themselves with radically new options for achieving whatever it is that they happen to seek. I want the glorious renaissance future as much as anyone. I have worked for it, however tortuously, my whole career. It breaks my heart to see the potential in sight and forgo it, but the argument—that if we get there by growing models rather than engineering them, we will lose everything in the end—seems very strong to me. I am still wrestling with it and its staggering implications. I do not have answers, but as a first step, I wanted to share my present concerns. Daniel Selsam September 14, 2026 Link to original doc: docs.google.com/document/d/e…
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We simply don’t have the capital, talent, or industry in Australia to stand a chance of catching up to the frontier this late in the game. Compute should be our strategic advantage; it’s what will buy us ongoing frontier-model access
"Without a sovereign AI frontier model here in Australia, we are going to be a supplicant state, not a sovereign state." Speaking with @USSC’s Olivia Shen at #TSDAIMasterclass, the Hon. Andrew Hastie MP gave his view of what's at stake in 🇦🇺's AI policy debate. Watch below ⤵️
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