The conditions that enabled the first Trump-Iran deal have changed. The new conditions suggest no durable US-Iran deal will emerge until Trump’s term ends. This has significant implications for Trump's potential use of a MOAB against Pickaxe Mountain. In February, the Iranians still believed a deal with Trump was possible. They saw Trump as a president who yearned to be historic - either by striking a deal with Tehran or by becoming the president who got rid of the Islamic Republic. If the latter proved impossible, Trump was still attracted to the idea of a deal. Tehran no longer holds this view. Instead, Trump is seen as an inherently unstable and immature person who may want a deal, but does not have the discipline to secure one or the strength to keep it in the face of attacks from Israel and pro-Israeli forces in the US. Moreover, the Iranian narrative suggests that Trump did not hurt enough before agreeing to the MOU. Had the war been more costly, he would have had stronger incentives to keep the agreement. Combined with the idea that he cannot keep a deal, this results in an Iranian perception that the war can only end once the cost of continuing it becomes intolerable for Trump. That is, incentives or face-saving exits won’t end the war; Trump reaching a military dead-end will. These perceptions profoundly shape the implications of Trump striking Pickaxe Mountain with a MOAB. Tehran’s likely reaction will be to expand the war significantly. Iran’s experience with Trump is that he backs off only if Tehran inflicts high costs on his strategy. A proportional Iranian response to an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be to strike at other nuclear facilities in the region, including in the UAE and Israel. While this would significantly destabilize the region, Tehran believes only such a response would prompt Trump to back off. Read full analysis: tritaparsi.substack.com/p/ca…