We built an instant run-off voting simulator, if you want to understand how this voting system works. anode.gg/simulators/irv/

We published an updated version of our DAO Delegate Handbook. Dive in to see what makes a delegates useful for DAOs, what to avoid and how to be a great delegate: anode.gg/research/dao-delega…

DAOs take note! Governance needs to be developed as an integral part of the offering and protocol. This will be expected of DeFi by institutional players. Get ahead of this today.

The @reserveprotocol governance attack has shifted into next gear. After a malicious proposal on a DTF with < $5,000 market cap passed the vote, guardians cancelled the proposal, as they should. The attacker now used a script/bot to launch 1656 malicious proposals with titles starting with "Fucking Guardians:..." This is basically a denial of service attack. The malicious proposals completely drowned out any legit proposals that were active, and are so numerous that the Reserve app (app.reserve.org/explorer/gov…) can no longer display all malicious proposals. What to do? We recommended to pause the token and then find a way for holders to withdraw their funds. The DTF had no interactions for months, so interest seems to be low. Cyber security and governance security has completely changed in the age of cheap AI, low TVL tokens and plenty of angry people. The days of WAGMI are gone.

The amount of malicious governance proposals on @reserveprotocol has now balooned to 16(!!) submitted in the last 3 days. In addition to the proposals, the attacker(s) have bought minority stakes in governance tokens on some DTFs to increase the chances of ramming through ADMIN changes and getting broad permissions for adding malicious collateral. We're rallying community and working with the guardian multisig to ensure none of them pass. Reserve is safe. Attackers will loose time and funds. Just work with Anode.

We've detected four malicious governance proposal in @reserveprotocol in the last two days. Unsure where the sudden inflow comes from. Thankfully Reserve's Governor contracts have execution delays, a great governing community and Anode as well as Decurity on the watch. Four of the five proposals in the screenshot are admin swaps, where the attackers seeks to gain full control over the vault. The exemption in the picture is ETH+. That also points to the utility of having a clear governance procedure. If every proposal that isn't first published on the forum is default-no, this makes attacks much harder to pull of and easier to detect. The Reserve App makes detecting payload anomalies very easy, see screenshot two. If the proposal seeks to "rebalance the DTF" but grants an unknown role, it's pretty obvious why this isn't a well-meant proposal. Procedures matter! Watchfullness matters! Stay safe.

Bad answers protocols give to common questions an institutional risk manager has: "Who can change the rules of this protocol?" "Some variation of a token vote, probably, though three wallets hold a blocking minority and we do not know who two of them are." Write down who holds power, what checks and balances are in place, what breaks under stress, how it is escalated and where and how everything is documented. All in a form a non-specialist can challenge. You cannot decentralize what you cannot measure. Done well, the same documentation serves token holders and risk committees. Decentralization should mean more transparency, not less.

Fascinating point by a friendly lawyer: All blockchains are inherently non-GDPR compliant because right to deletion is unenforceable in practice. This leads to substantially more difficult compliance duties for customer facing third parties.

A Swiss Stiftung is legally tied to its purpose, called “Zweck” in Swiss law. The assets “belong” to the Zweck/purpose. The board administers them. Tokenholders don't get a veto, Discord doesn't get a veto, and the council can't just rewrite the deed. When the stated purpose no longer seems attainable or desirable, Swiss law gives you a few doors. Governed by Art.86, 86a, 88 and 85, they do different jobs. Art. 86 ZGB is Zweckänderung - change of purpose. The board or the Aufsichtsbehörde files, and the competent federal or cantonal authority decides. This gets tested: has the original “Zweck” taken on a wholly different meaning or effect, then the foundation has plainly become estranged from the founder's will. The German language is sharper here. "Offenbar entfremdet." means the purpose still exists. It just no longer does what the Founder meant. Art. 86a would let the founder reserve a rewrite, if they reserved it in the original file “Urkunde”. This can be done up to ten years since setup (or since the last founder-requested change). If the founder is a legal entity the right lasts 20 years after establishment. If the Stiftung is tax-exempt public good / charitable “gemeinnuetzig” under Art. 56 lit. g DBG, the new purpose has to stay public or charitable too. This can bite Foundations wishing to transition into a more centralized for-profit corporation like structure. Art. 88 is concerned with the “Aufhebung”. The dissolution. The authority can do it on application or of its own accord. Either because the Zweck has become unattainable - and the foundation can’t be kept alive by changing the deed - or the Zweck has become unlawful or immoral. It's important to notice the order inside Art 88. Purpose unattainable get checked first. An amendment second. Dissolution is a last resort. Art. 85 sits on the side to the others. Organisational change instead of purpose change. This is usually an urgent matter, that preserves the assets or keeps the purpose realisable. The federal authority “Aufsichts” oversight applies, the board gets heard. This can be a way if the council is the issue. This is where a lot of Web3 Stiftungen get stuck, imo. If the deed says "promote blockchain / DLT / open networks" you can probably still do that after the token is down 99%, the lab left, or the DAO didn’t pass a meaningful proposal for months. A broadly defined “Zweck” is a feature at setup which later becomes a trap. The purpose is still attainable, so invoking Art. 88 is closed. And Art. 86 wants estrangement from the founder's will. A successful decentralisation can be that (the Stiftung as a leftover office, still sitting on IP and runway). This has to be handled with nuance and care to not fall afoul of fines and regulations. The actual work needing to be done is usually: read the original founding document, the “Urkunde” line by line. See whether you're still inside the existing purpose (interpretation, board resolution, maybe a tightened programme). See whether Art. 86a was reserved and the clock is running. See who the Aufsicht even is (ESA vs the canton of seat, often Zug). Here, Mina's public runway / scale-down talk is a useful specimen. "The foundation should recede" is an Art. 86 / 88 question. Who files, with which authority, toward what leftover purpose, and where do the assets go if you actually dissolve. This requires deep knowledge of local laws, reach out if you want to dive deeper or learn more.

Uniswap Protocol has now processed $3T in all-time volume on Ethereum mainnet World Computer

“Introducing ETHis - the Real World Ethereum Summit” by Raphael Spannocchi (@raphbaph) ETHis: Real-world Ethereum summit at Munich’s Deutsches Museum (July 2-3, 2026). Answers “What can Ethereum do for me?” via stablecoins, RWAs & d/acc.