YouTube: The Rabbit Hole | Thought Adventure Podcast

Abdul Rahman (TAP) retweeted
What exactly would it mean for God to “take on a human body”? 1. Does God spatially indwell in a human body? Christians themselves reject this. It would mean the body is literally a place that physically encompasses God. 2. Does it mean that God is present with the man through His knowledge, power, support or action? Both Muslims and Christians believe this is possible, but none of this makes the man God or vice versa, even if the relation is uniquely close or unlike His relation to anyone else. So what does it mean then? It has to mean that there’s some kind of metaphysical union between the divine and the human, which could be understood in a few ways: 3. Does the divine nature itself become human through transformation or conversion? This again is not what Christians believe. If the divine reality actually changes into humanity, then either something essential to divinity is lost, in which case He is no longer fully God, or nothing essential to divinity is lost, in which case the divine reality itself has not become human. 4. Do the divine and human natures fuse or mix into one combined reality? Again, this is not what Christians believe. If the resulting combination genuinely acquires mortality, weakness or dependence, then the divine nature is no longer what it was. If those remain properties only of the human nature, then no combination happened. 5. Does the divine person remain fully God while also becoming fully human, with the divine and human natures remaining distinct and neither being converted into the other? This is what Christians believe. So what does it mean on this account to say that this person “loses that body through a process called death”? Death is predicated of the person, not the “nature”. A nature is what something is. Human nature is not another individual standing beside the person who can die. If there is one person, then it is that person who dies, is weak, lacks knowledge, suffers, and so on. But those predicates cannot simply be added to the same person alongside their exact opposites. If a person is all-knowing, that itself excludes ignorance in that person. If he knows every truth, he cannot also be ignorant of some truth. If a person is omnipotent, that itself excludes weakness or a lack of power in that person. He cannot both possess all power and lack the power to do something within the scope of that power. If a person possesses necessary and perfect life, that itself excludes the possibility of death. If “this person is dead” is genuinely being predicated of that same person, then it cannot simultaneously be true that “this person cannot die”. So this claim that Islam “limits” God ends up turning back on the incarnation itself because it requires the same divine person to be both unlimited in knowledge, power and life, and yet genuinely ignorant, weak and dead. This literally does the opposite of making God “unlimited”. It makes your account of God both deficient and internally incoherent.
Muslim admits her god is limited because he can’t take on a human body and then lose that body through a process called death. Interesting.
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Abdul Rahman (TAP) retweeted
Re: Donations for Medicine Needed 🚨 As-Salāmu ʿAlaykum brothers and sisters, today's bills for prescriptions came up to $560.89, with travel costs being $190. Please donate if you can. BuyMeACoffee: buymeacoffee.com/ijazthetrin… Or PayPal: paypal.me/ccdonationsca
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It’s genuinely hilarious that even with AI at their fingertips these guys still can’t grasp the ABCs of the very things they talk about day and night. The idea that either of these schools believes God’s eternal speech literally inhabits paper or tongues is just laughable. Yet we have entire Christological arguments built on this elementary stupidity. What an embarrassment.
Muslims following the Sunnī Maturidi & Ash'arī aqeedāh(school of thought), which is the biggest aqeedāh in Islam, cannot logically on metaphysical principle reject our doctrine of Orthodox Christology, that's God the Word assuming human flesh, without it becoming eternal or the divine nature becoming created. For example, let's compare it with their understanding of what the Qur'ān is. For them, the eternal Qur'ān can exist on a writing surface or someone’s tongue aswell as on the preserved tablet in the presence of God. That's, the Qur'an is both assuming, & entering creation without alteration of substance/mixture. This theology is analogous to what our Christology entails, that God the Word united & assumed human nature unto Himself without morphing into change, or an alteration. The Shi’a & Mu’tazilites knew this too. It’s the reason they rejected the doctrine of Kalam Nafzī, & even stated & accused them that they’ve received such a philosophy from the Christians.
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Abdul Rahman (TAP) retweeted
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Abdul Rahman (TAP) retweeted
David Wood is pathetic. He's supposedly been a "Christian" for 30 years and an apologist for 20+ years but can't even name the essentials of "the Gospel." Is salvation by faith alone essential? We'll never know.
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Abdul Rahman (TAP) retweeted
Another low iq bot. I have an entire chapter in my book called Misreading Judaism. I deal with the two powers in heaven literature. There were no Trinitarian Jews before Christ. Stop lying.
I won’t debate you because you’re a fundamentally dishonest person, Jake. Briefly, we have numerous examples of the Old Testament recognizing Yahweh being in two places at once - both present in heaven and on earth in visible (in some instances physical) form. Go read Dr. Michael Heiser’s The Unseen Realm, then come back to me and explain why that scholarly opinion is incorrect.
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Abdul Rahman (TAP) retweeted
Here’s another reason why the Islamic Dilemma doesn’t even get off the ground. Even if all the sayings of Jesus were confirmed by the Quran as the “Injil” if we had the same hermeneutical freedom as Christians we could offer more plausible explanations for certain statements than them to reconcile the statements that appear to contradict with Islam. Think about how many times Christians failed to recognise Jesus has less knowledge (Mark 13:32) Jesus denying being the Good God of the Old Testament (Mark 10:18) as well as pointing to the Father as the Only True God (John 17:3). Just on this aspect alone of Jesus not being God these Christians still give these verses Tawil. If they were consistent and allowed us this sort of freedom to make tawil then yes 100% of the Gospel sayings can be reconciled. If they don’t want to grant us this then it’s now equally a dilemma for them because now they’ll have to acknowledge those verses they tawil about Jesus lack of divinity can’t also be reconciled as they are insufficient explanations. You can’t just demand from muslims very plausible contextual readings without tawil when you yourself are masters of the arts of tawil. It’s just that muslims have been too shy to go in there and tawil these sayings the way that you guys do. It’s improper to do so and is disengenous. Now to make it clear im not saying i believe in this position that the Sayings are all preserved. I believe taking such a position is highly implausible, you can’t reconcile jesus sayings comprehensively with islam in a plausible honest fashion. I just wanted to highlight why the Islamic dilemma can’t even follow to begin with if one is a Christian. It’s set up with an unfair argument a double standard i should say, where “hermenuatical freedom is for me and not for thee”
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Good point. God “making it appear” that He’s unipersonal for millennia before revealing himself to be triune is a far better candidate for deception, given that this concerns the very nature of the God humanity is supposed to worship. Now compare that to merely making a man appear to have died when he in fact isn’t God and should not be worshipped.
Replying to @abdul_now
Not to mention the supposed triune nature of God being hidden for the vast majority of history. Christianity is literally based on millennia long prank being suddenly revealed.
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If “making something appear to be the case when it is in fact not” amounts to deception, then by that logic, God (whether the Christian or Muslim God) is constantly “deceiving the world”. If your point is that making it appear as though Jesus was crucified lends some kind of credence to Christianity, then that’s an even sillier argument. The appearance of Jesus undergoing humiliation, crucifixion and death is precisely the sort of thing that would count AGAINST his divinity. If anything, him appearing to get overpowered and die is a far stronger argument against his being God than if he hadn’t appeared to die.
Allah deceived the world in Islam*
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Abdul Rahman (TAP) retweeted
Replying to @DerWulf
Try actually reading the Bible retard John 14:28 “The Father is greater than I.” Mark 13:32 “But concerning that day or that hour, no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father.” John 17:3 “That they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.” Matthew 26:39 Jesus prays to God in Gethsemane: “Not as I will, but as you will.” John 20:17 After the resurrection: “I ascend to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.” Mark 10:18 “Why do you call me good? No one is good except God alone.”
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Abdul Rahman (TAP) retweeted
The irony is that this single verse closes off every avenue by which “Son of God” could mean anything at all, until nothing is left for your theology to stand on. “Originator of the heavens and the earth. How could He have a son when He has no consort? He created everything, and He has knowledge of all things.” (Quran 6:101) Once “Son” no longer means ordinary begetting, sonship through the incarnation and miraculous birth, an eternal self-standing being generated from or simply existing alongside God, or God’s own Word and knowledge treated as another person, there is no intelligible relation left for the term to describe. 1. “How could He have a son when He has no consort?” This dismantles sonship in its ordinary sense (actual begetting). Begetting is not simply bringing something into existence. It’s offspring that comes from two corresponding sources. Remove that second source and you can still have some kind of generation, but it’s no longer called “begetting”. Eve, for example, was created from Adam alone, yet Adam is not her father and she is not his daughter. That was creation from him, not begetting by him. So that rules out the first possible sense of sonship: ordinary begetting. 2. “Originator of the heavens and the earth.” This dismantles sonship understood through the incarnation and miraculous birth of Jesus. If “Son” means the one who became incarnate and was born of Mary, then this does nothing to establish sonship in the first place. God is the one who originated Jesus and created him within Mary’s womb. He is his Creator, not his father. The Quran mentions the same of Adam (3:59): God created him without either parent, yet this made Adam God’s creation, not His son. 3. “He created everything.” This dismantles the idea of an eternal, self-standing son generated from God, as well as the attempt to avoid generation altogether and simply posit another eternal divine person alongside Him. If “Son” means an eternal, self-standing being generated from the Father (“begotten, not made”), then an eternal self-standing being must be necessary in himself. If the Son’s being comes from the Father, he is not necessary in himself. If he is necessary in himself, his being does not come from another. And if generation is abandoned altogether (cc: WLC), so that the “Son” is simply another eternal divine person who exists alongside God without deriving his being from Him, then any actual relation of sonship has disappeared altogether. We’re no longer explaining sonship, we’re simply positing another eternal deity alongside God. Again, this is already covered by “He created everything”: there is no uncreated self-standing reality alongside Him. And look at how plainly the Quran puts the same point in 23:91: “God has never taken a son, nor has there ever been any god alongside Him. Were it otherwise, each god would have claimed his own creation, and some would have risen above others.” The two claims are placed side by side for a reason. Once “son” stops meaning any kind of begetting or derivation, what remains is simply the claim of another god alongside Him. So to sum up this third category, “He created everything” leaves no room for either possibility. 4. “And He has knowledge of all things.” This dismantles the attempt to identify the son with God’s own eternal Word, Wisdom, or knowledge. The remaining option is to say that the Son is not a separate self-standing being, but God’s eternal Word, Wisdom, or perfect knowledge of Himself. This became a major model in Augustinian and later scholastic theology, and it’s still around today (not just in old textbooks but among theologians who actively defend it). But if the Word is God’s knowledge or wisdom, it is an attribute of the knower, not another person (and certainly not a son). If it is turned into a self-standing person distinct from Him, the third argument returns. So “He has knowledge of all things” places that knowledge in God Himself, not in another being begotten from Him. So while you sit there and giggle about it, this single verse comprehensively dismantles your entire theology: - Ordinary begetting is ruled out by the absence of a corresponding source. - Miraculous origination establishes creation, not sonship. - Eternal generation collapses into either dependence or creation. - A second underived person is no longer a son but another being alongside God, yet that makes him fall under the “everything” God created. - The Word or knowledge is His attribute, not another person and not His “son”.
Interestingly, Allah could have a son (Q. 39:4) but he'd just need a wife to do it (Q. 6:101) Meanwhile Mary is easily able to have a son without needing a husband (Q. 19:20-21). Mary can do what Allah cannot.
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Update: Mike didn’t cite a contemporary American legal scholar as an authority on the linguistic conventions of seventh-century Arabia. He cited him to define what a majestic plural means…in the language of seventh-century Arabia. 👍🏻👍🏻👍🏻
Replying to @abdul_now
Nice ad hominem, but never did I say he is a scholar on seventh-century Arabia, so you are lying. I only cited him on defining what a majestic plural means. I also noticed you didn’t actually refute the point. Nice try.
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This guy cited a contemporary American legal scholar as an authority on the linguistic conventions of seventh-century Arabic and he’s trying to give us a lesson on research methodology
Muslims need to realize that asking AI to respond for you is not the same as doing actual research. I am being accused of not reading the studies when it is clear @1athariarchive did not. He put my post in AI and asked it to respond to me. Modern dawah is just running to ChatGPT or Grok and begging for help. Since I did read all these papers (and he did not), let's go through them. First, he brings up Fox's paper, "Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions?" and says, "Jonathan Fox explicitly states in his study: 'The results show that there is INSUFFICENT evidence to support the stereotype of the Islamic militant.'" Interestingly, he did not cite the very next sentence, "However, religion tends to be a more important factor in conflicts involving Islamic ethnoreligious groups." Notice I never cited Fox to say the stereotype of the Islamic militant is true. I cited his paper because he does find a link between Islam and an increase in persecutions and conflicts. To quote, "The results, presented in Table 2, show that the mean level of religious involvement in ethnoreligious conflicts is higher for Islamic majority groups for all four religion variables and that these differences are statistically significant. In addition, Christian majority groups score the lowest on all four of these variables. Islamic majority groups engage in more than double the average level of religious discrimination as non-Islamic groups and nearly five times the average level of Christian majority groups. Religious legitimacy is about 50 per cent more important for conflicts involving Islamic majorities than for conflicts involving non-Islamic majorities, including those involving Christian majorities. Islamic conflicts score about twice as high on both the composite religion variable and on the relevance of religion variable as non- Islamic groups, and about two-and-a-half times as high as Christian majorities. Thus, there is clear evidence that religion is considerably more important to conflicts involving Islamic majorities and less important in conflicts involving Christian majorities." So he lied about why I cited it and ignored the result of it. I never said muslims are inherently more violent, but Islam is linked to an increase in discrimination and conflicts, so why did he lie? Or should I say, why did his AI get it wrong? Next, he is taking Monica Duffy Toft out of context. He said, "Her principal statistical finding concerns politically excluded Arab Muslim populations and a particular category of religious civil war. She explicitly states: 'There is no evidence of Arab Muslim exceptionalism for other kinds of civil wars.'" But notice he cited a line where she said, "other kinds of civil wars." Well, when we read this in context, we see this, "These models provide support for Hypothesis 1b: centrally religious civil wars are disproportionately an Arab Muslim phenomenon, even when controlling for standard variables and potential confounders. Exclusion of other religious groups has no effect on the probability of the onset of central religious civil war. There is no evidence of Arab Muslim exceptionalism for other kinds of civil wars. The presence or absence of particular religious groups has no effect for non-identity based civil wars. The exclusion of Christian ethnic groups has just as much of an impact on the onset of identity-based but non-religious civil wars as Muslim ethnic groups. By contrast, the exclusion of Christian ethnic groups is negatively related to the onset of peripherally religious civil wars." In other words, centrally religious civil wars are disproportionately an Arab Muslim phenomenon, but not any other type of civil war. She notes the results are nuanced (and I agree), but even says in the conclusion, "The results are clear that religion is a motivator for rebellion among Arab Muslims while their Christian counterparts are more likely to be motivated along secular lines after 1990." So Islam is a motivating factor in civil wars, as I said. This is what happens when you ask AI to do your research instead of taking the time to read the papers. Next, when he cited Choi and Brown's paper, he could not even quote the full sentence. He said, "turning to Seung Whan Choi and Davis Brown's empirical study, the authors explicitly acknowledge: 'Despite Islam itself not being necessarily violence-prone', before discussing how militant organisations may exploit religion to justify political objectives." If you read the full sentence, you see, "Despite Islam itself not being necessarily violence-prone, Muslim fundamentalists exploit it to their political advantages by selectively citing Islamic texts (Kelvington 2019)." So Islamic texts are used to motivate terrorist attacks. He then takes them out of context again. He said, "They also conclude: 'Our overall analysis suggests that Islam is more than epiphenomenal but less than causal.'" Again, let's look at the full quote, "Our overall analysis suggests that Islam is more than epiphenomenal but less than causal. Especially since we draw our inferences and conclusion on the basis of empirical tests that are all about the probability of such violent events, we cannot claim that Islam is a direct cause of the deadliest political violence. However, our tests indicate a strong correlation between the two factors: countries with more Muslims are more vulnerable to suicide terrorism than countries with fewer Muslims." So all they are saying is the data cannot prove causation, but they still are suggesting Islam likely plays a role. It is normal for sociological studies to state their limitations, which doesn't change the fact that there is a link. All this muslim is doing is appealing to the mere possibility that the link is arbitrary, when the evidence points in the opposite direction. Next, as for Brown's paper, he says, "However, Brown acknowledges that the study does not establish why these relationships differ between religions. He explicitly states: 'No explanation is offered for the different results herein', before discussing several possible explanations, including religious identity, religious commitment, political circumstances and religious teachings concerning warfare." First, this doesn't change the results of his paper, which finds Islam is linked to an increase in interstate armed conflict. Second, if you read his book, "War and Religion in a Secular Age," he does argue extensively that the reason for this result is islam has a permissive war ethic. To quote, “Islamic law is frozen at a time when Islamdom was very strong and successful, its technology equivalent or superior to that of its rivals, its higher learning flourishing, its military campaigns largely successful, and Islam itself being propagated rapidly (Martin, 1991: 109). These characteristics, naturally induced historical perception of self-superiority, and that perception has strongly influenced the Islamic perception of Otherness. In Islam, the Other consists of the forces of deception, unbelief, and shirk (the association of other beings with God), as opposed to the forces of the straight path and submission to God. . . . Such a worldview is a recipe for Islamic hostility toward non-Islam…” (122-123). “The scriptural basis for actually fighting Jews and Christians is Q. 9:29. Muslims are to fight against those who do not believe in God or the Last Day, who do not forbid what God and (or through) his messenger Muhammad, forbidden, have not performed dana, and then until they pay the jizya (tax) submissively” (135). So Brown does find a link between Islam and conflict and does attribute this to teachings in Islam. Next, @1athariarchive asked Ai to find a bunch of studies that merely show other variables are linked to more conflict, which is beside the point. No one is denying that other variables, like political and economic factors, can increase conflicts, but Islam is STILL one of those factors. He cites, "Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen" but he clearly did not read it, because the authors say they are just exploring possibilities, not making definite claims. They even call for more reliable models and throw out challenges to the research they cite. Here is what they say on page 6, "More sophisticated causal models are needed to assess whether religion itself plays a role in armed conflict." So his AI cited a paper that does not claim this is the result of the paper, only that it is a possibility from limited evidence. This is what happened when you ask AI to do the research for you instead of checking the source. So once again, muslims accuse us of lying, but demonstrate they are either the real liars or run our posts through AI and ask it to respond to us because they cannot take the time to do actual research. Without lies, Islam dies!
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Abdul Rahman (TAP) retweeted
Replying to @LucinehK_
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Abdul Rahman (TAP) retweeted
This is even more impressive when you realize that Quranic exegetes for centuries did not realize these.
The Quranic author knows Hebrew! 😯 Speaker: Dr Ali Ataie
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This is genuinely an excellent refutation to another distortions of Christian polemic work...
Yet another low-IQ argument against Islam that shows how these guys are incapable of looking even one layer beneath the surface of their own arguments. Firstly, the very interpretive tools you rely on to explain biblical passages that you see as implying anthropomorphism are also used by Muslim theologians. I myself reject their reinterpretations, but the point is that the scriptural language you object to occurs in both traditions, and both contain schools that reinterpret it according to what they take reason to establish about the divine. It’s quite philosophically naive to present a shared interpretive question as a refutation of one religion in favor of the other. You need to establish a relevant difference. Granting yourself the use of those kinds of hermeneutic tools while just ignoring their use among Muslims is quite silly. In response to Christian objections about divine attributes, Ibn Taymiyya says: “The point is that these attributes [to which the Christians object] occur in the scriptures, in the Torah and elsewhere, just as they occur in the Quran. They are therefore not peculiar to Muslims. Christians cannot place this on the same footing as their distinctive doctrines of the Trinity and the hypostatic union, which are peculiar to them.” (Al-Jawab al-Sahih, 4/421) An Ash’ari, for example, could accept your argument against corporeality without taking on the additional burden of defending the Trinity and Incarnation. So even on your own premises, the dispute would be about which account of the divine nature is correct. It wouldn’t establish the truth of one religion and the falsity of another. The positions that DO actually distinguish your position from the Muslim one (like the Trinity and the Incarnation) are the relevant ones if we’re adjudicating between the religions, and they’re precisely the ones your argument tries to dodge. Secondly, even granting for argument’s sake that these “problems” are uniquely Islamic (which they obviously are not), why should your understanding of what constitutes “contingency” simply be accepted as rationally decisive? Arguments like this depend on deeper questions about the epistemology and metaphysics of modality, which directly affect how one would need to justify the idea that something “could have been otherwise”. Philosophers differ on the relationship between different kinds of modality/possibility, like epistemic possibility vs metaphysical possibility (basically, what our knowledge leaves open vs what could genuinely be the case). So the question of when conceivability warrants conclusions about metaphysical possibility or necessity is one on which philosophers hold different positions. Those differences don’t on their own mean that there isn’t an obviously correct position, but they do mean that in the context of the argument you’re trying to make, you need to defend the one you see as superior instead of simply assuming it. When you say that something “could have been this way or that way”, do you mean that you haven’t identified anything that rules out the alternative, or that you’ve established that the alternative is genuinely possible for that thing? The first relates to the limits of your knowledge, and the second relates to what is possible for the thing itself. Imagining things differently does not by itself establish that they could really have been different (unless you defend a theory of modality that warrants that inference). Your argument needs more solid ground than the mere absence of a contradiction in your imagination. Otherwise, it would equally apply to all views that don’t hold to divine simplicity, which is a massive problem if u hold to “three distinct persons” in God. So on the one hand, none of this is particular to Islam, which even a first-year philosophy student should recognise. On the other, even if it were, your argument assumes a great deal about “contingency” (which, again, even a 1st year philosophy student should recognise).
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Abdul Rahman (TAP) retweeted
Replying to @InspiringPhilos
Mike the collage artist strikes again.
Anyone who’s followed this guy for a while knows his usual routine: giant collage of screenshots from whatever papers he can grab, a confident caption about whatever it is he's trying to prove, and no serious engagement with what the authors actually say. It gives the impression of doing serious research, but it’s really just tossing pictures of studies around and hoping no one reads them closely. Unfortunately for him, I happened to have some free time over the past few hours (and nothing better to do). I used an AI to pull the relevant passages from Fish’s work, then went back and checked everything against the actual articles and book chapters myself. So here's what's happening: Firstly, Mike seems to assume that any pattern or correlation that remains after some “controls” establishes a causal relationship. But controls don’t automatically create a clean, lab-like comparison. They just adjust for a few broad differences on paper (things like income or political system). Sometimes that helps clarify what might be causing a pattern. Other times, it barely scratches the surface because real-world outcomes are shaped by things you simply can’t “control away” with a few variables: history, conflict, foreign intervention, state stability, regional dynamics, and so on. Researchers know this, and they’re careful about how far they push their claims. Mike clearly isn’t. Fish himself is very clear about this. In his article on large-scale political violence he flat-out says that he and his co-authors: “cannot pretend to resolve the weighty question at hand or to make causal inferences” And that their findings are only: “a starting point” given the limits of the data. In other words: these studies are early attempts to map out a complicated issue, not a solid case for “Islam leads to X.” But Mike talks as if once a pattern survives a few controls, the explanation is already obvious. He never really stops to ask whether those patterns might be shaped by where many Muslim-majority countries are located in the first place: places shaped by post-colonial borders, proxy wars, foreign intervention, weak states, and long-running regional conflicts. So he’s clearly confused about what “controlling for” something can actually do. Adding GDP or a democracy score to a model doesn’t erase all those deeper forces, it just adjusts for a couple of broad differences on paper. It doesn’t recreate history or hold everything constant. And with some types of data, that kind of adjustment barely works at all, as you’ll see below from Fish himself. The terrorism chapter Now to the slides Mike posted from the terrorism chapter of "Are Muslims Distinctive?" The part he thinks really nails his point. From that chapter, he quotes Fish’s stats on high-casualty bombings (1994–2008): “…self-proclaimed Islamists have been responsible for over three-fifths of all incidents and nearly seven-tenths of all deaths. Terrorism is not a uniquely Muslim disease, but its perpetrators in recent times are disproportionately Islamists.” Fish adds: “Muslims may be prone to tolerate terrorism in the name of their religion, which in turn points our attention to explanations for Islamist terrorism that have a religious dimension.” So there is something to explain. But here is what Mike doesn’t tell you, even though it’s on the very same pages he’s drawing from. Fish immediately warns that the kind of statistical analysis he uses in other parts of the book doesn’t really work for these bombings: “Statistical analyses of the type that we conduct on many other matters in this book would be less useful here. … our units are neither people nor countries nor country-specific events, and it would be difficult to control for factors that may influence the incidence of terrorist bombings.” In simple terms: In other chapters, Fish is comparing countries or people, where you can at least try to line them up on income, regime type, region, etc. In this chapter, the “unit” is each bombing, and most of those bombings are piled up in a few places that are already on fire: civil wars, insurgencies, occupations, failed states. To “control for” things properly here, you’d need: - countries that are equally poor - equally authoritarian - with equally deep wars and foreign interference - that differ mainly in religion In reality, we don’t have neat pairs like “Muslim Afghanistan vs non-Muslim Afghanistan” or “Muslim Iraq vs non-Muslim Iraq” (I’m not saying we need “clone” countries for this to work, but you get the idea). The worst war zones are mostly Muslim countries, and war and the terrorism feed into each other. If you throw “civil war: yes/no” into the model, you’re partly controlling away the very conflict that produces the bombings in the first place. That’s why Fish says the usual style of analysis “would be less useful here” and that it’s “difficult to control” for the drivers of these bombings. He’s basically saying this shows what happened in that period, not the result of a clean, controlled comparison. He also underlines how context-bound these attacks are. He points out that: - A huge share of the bombings occur in just a handful of countries (Afghanistan, Algeria, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka), and - Islamist-claimed bombings are even more concentrated inside war and insurgency zones. Fish notes that terrorist attacks are “much more likely to happen in places beset by civil wars or insurgencies than in places that are not.” So even as he tells you Islamists are over-represented in this kind of terrorism, he’s also telling you: - This is about certain groups in certain wars, - The data are not suited to a full “we’ve isolated Islam” analysis, - Terrorism itself is “not a uniquely Muslim disease.” Mike’s move is to take that limited, heavily qualified picture and talk as if Fish had shown: “We controlled for everything and proved Islam leads to terrorism.” Fish explicitly says he cannot do that here. Mike insists on pretending he can. Where the rest of Fish’s violence work points: If you look at the broader research Fish is drawing on, the story is even less like Mike’s slogan. In the article on large-scale political violence (civil wars and big episodes of internal conflict), Fish and his co-authors “find no evidence of a correlation” between a higher Muslim share of the population and more deaths from that kind of violence, and they stress again that they “cannot… make causal inferences” and see their results as a “starting point.” On ordinary violent crime, Fish is blunt. Summarizing the homicide data, he writes: “One explanation we can rule out is that Muslims are violent people.” He notes that predominantly Muslim countries have much lower murder rates than non-Muslim countries: “more Muslims, less homicide.” So from Fish you actually get three things at once: - No special Muslim excess in deaths from big civil wars. - Lower murder rates in Muslim-majority countries. - A specific, modern pattern where Islamists are over-represented among certain high-casualty bombings in a small cluster of war zones. A pattern Fish himself says is hard to analyse with proper controls. A careful reader might come away thinking: Muslims as a whole are certainly not more violent, but there is a terrorism problem around some Islamist movements in particular conflicts, shaped by a mix of political conditions, war, occupation, and state breakdown, not by Islam in isolation. Mike turns that into a single sweeping claim that Islam is the underlying cause of all these problems.
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Yet another low-IQ argument against Islam that shows how these guys are incapable of looking even one layer beneath the surface of their own arguments. Firstly, the very interpretive tools you rely on to explain biblical passages that you see as implying anthropomorphism are also used by Muslim theologians. I myself reject their reinterpretations, but the point is that the scriptural language you object to occurs in both traditions, and both contain schools that reinterpret it according to what they take reason to establish about the divine. It’s quite philosophically naive to present a shared interpretive question as a refutation of one religion in favor of the other. You need to establish a relevant difference. Granting yourself the use of those kinds of hermeneutic tools while just ignoring their use among Muslims is quite silly. In response to Christian objections about divine attributes, Ibn Taymiyya says: “The point is that these attributes [to which the Christians object] occur in the scriptures, in the Torah and elsewhere, just as they occur in the Quran. They are therefore not peculiar to Muslims. Christians cannot place this on the same footing as their distinctive doctrines of the Trinity and the hypostatic union, which are peculiar to them.” (Al-Jawab al-Sahih, 4/421) An Ash’ari, for example, could accept your argument against corporeality without taking on the additional burden of defending the Trinity and Incarnation. So even on your own premises, the dispute would be about which account of the divine nature is correct. It wouldn’t establish the truth of one religion and the falsity of another. The positions that DO actually distinguish your position from the Muslim one (like the Trinity and the Incarnation) are the relevant ones if we’re adjudicating between the religions, and they’re precisely the ones your argument tries to dodge. Secondly, even granting for argument’s sake that these “problems” are uniquely Islamic (which they obviously are not), why should your understanding of what constitutes “contingency” simply be accepted as rationally decisive? Arguments like this depend on deeper questions about the epistemology and metaphysics of modality, which directly affect how one would need to justify the idea that something “could have been otherwise”. Philosophers differ on the relationship between different kinds of modality/possibility, like epistemic possibility vs metaphysical possibility (basically, what our knowledge leaves open vs what could genuinely be the case). So the question of when conceivability warrants conclusions about metaphysical possibility or necessity is one on which philosophers hold different positions. Those differences don’t on their own mean that there isn’t an obviously correct position, but they do mean that in the context of the argument you’re trying to make, you need to defend the one you see as superior instead of simply assuming it. When you say that something “could have been this way or that way”, do you mean that you haven’t identified anything that rules out the alternative, or that you’ve established that the alternative is genuinely possible for that thing? The first relates to the limits of your knowledge, and the second relates to what is possible for the thing itself. Imagining things differently does not by itself establish that they could really have been different (unless you defend a theory of modality that warrants that inference). Your argument needs more solid ground than the mere absence of a contradiction in your imagination. Otherwise, it would equally apply to all views that don’t hold to divine simplicity, which is a massive problem if u hold to “three distinct persons” in God. So on the one hand, none of this is particular to Islam, which even a first-year philosophy student should recognise. On the other, even if it were, your argument assumes a great deal about “contingency” (which, again, even a 1st year philosophy student should recognise).
Did you know Shapes disprove Islam?
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Abdul Rahman (TAP) retweeted
So Rumi’s Bacha boy who teaches gay poetry is collaborating with a sworn enemy of Islam, a blasphemer, on why Islamic civilization has “failed” Oy to the vey! Yes Rabbi Please Bless me Baruch Hashem Moshiach is coming
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