UVU REVIEW SYNOPSIS An independent review of Utah Valley University’s security planning and response surrounding the assassination of Charlie Kirk found significant gaps in preparation for the high-profile outdoor event.
Among the most important findings:
• No comprehensive written security plan: The event did not have a formal Security Assessment or written Event Action Plan outlining staffing, responsibilities, communications, contingencies and when additional resources should be requested.
• Open outdoor venue created vulnerabilities: The area had multiple access points, adjacent buildings, elevated walkways and numerous locations overlooking the event, complicating perimeter security and situational awareness.
• No comprehensive perimeter or screening: There was no controlled perimeter, formal attendee screening or credentialing system. Non-ticketed attendees generally could enter the event area without going through a controlled security point.
• Rooftop concerns were raised before the event: TPUSA security specifically raised concerns about student roof access near Kirk’s location. UVU restricted the Hall of Flags walkway and posted two officers there, but reviewers described that as a reactive measure rather than part of a documented site-security plan.
• Security cameras were not being specifically monitored for the event: Camera footage proved valuable after the shooting, but no one had been assigned to monitor relevant feeds in real time for event security. Reviewers recommend considering technology that could detect people on rooftops or in restricted areas.
• Staffing and resources were a concern: Reviewers found the lack of a formal security assessment, reliable attendance estimate and written plan made it difficult to systematically determine how many officers and resources were needed.
• No ambulance was staged at the event: Two UVU EMTs were there with trauma packs and provided aid after the shooting, but they could not transport patients, including Kirk, to a hospital.
• Problems identified years earlier resurfaced: A 2023 active-assailant exercise had already identified communication and situational-awareness problems. Reviewers said similar issues surfaced again on Sept. 10, suggesting earlier corrective actions had not been fully implemented or validated.
• Emergency alerts were problematic: The report says no immediate campus alert was activated by the police chief as incident commander, and subsequent alerts included delays, changing guidance and contradictory information.
The review also emphasizes what worked, including officers responding quickly after the shooting and UVU’s existing emergency plans and security technology. The report’s larger conclusion is that many of those existing resources were not sufficiently integrated into a formal, coordinated security operation for the event.
Sep 25, 2026 · 5:35 PM UTC
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The 158-page after-action report, released Sept. 25, examined UVU’s planning and security before Kirk was fatally shot during a Turning Point USA event on Sept. 10, 2025, as well as the university’s emergency response afterward.
The review found no UVU employee or agent acted “in bad faith or in willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others.” The authors also acknowledged that an after-action review has the benefit of hindsight and described a political assassination on a college campus as exceptionally rare.
Still, investigators identified significant areas where they said security planning should have been stronger.
NO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY PLAN
Among the most significant findings was the absence of a comprehensive written Security Assessment or Event Action Plan for Kirk’s appearance.
The report noted several factors that warranted more formal planning, including Kirk’s high profile, anticipated protests, an open outdoor venue, uncertainty about attendance, a private security team and elevated vantage points surrounding the event.
“Although some coordination occurred among University stakeholders, UVUPD, UVU Event Services, and TPUSA representatives, the club event was not supported by a comprehensive written Security Assessment or Event Action Plan,” the report states.
Such a plan could have established specific officer assignments, command responsibilities, communications procedures, access control, emergency response procedures, contingency plans and the use of outside law enforcement resources.
The report’s timeline identifies Aug. 27 as a key decision point, noting the event received formal approval “before a documented Security Assessment or written Event Action Plan was developed.”
OUTDOOR VENUE CREATED SECURITY CHALLENGES
UVU staff raised concerns before the event about using the Fountain Courtyard, but TPUSA preferred the outdoor location.
The report concluded UVU should have retained authority over security-related decisions on its campus, including the venue, ticketing and access control.
The Fountain Courtyard was surrounded by buildings, pedestrian routes and elevated areas that created multiple vantage points overlooking Kirk’s speaking location.
“The outdoor location insisted upon by TPUSA for their event created significant protective operations considerations,” investigators wrote.
While UVU addressed some concerns, including restricting access to the elevated Hall of Flags walkway above Kirk, the review found there was no documented line-of-sight assessment or structured security walk-through involving all the key parties.
The report said UVU police and Kirk’s private protection detail should have met several days before the event to evaluate vulnerabilities and determine whether they had enough personnel and equipment.
If they did not, investigators said “additional law enforcement support, equipment, or technical resources, such as drone or aerial observation capability, should have been considered or requested.”
A planned face-to-face meeting between UVU Police Chief Jeff Long and TPUSA security personnel on the morning of the event did not take place.
No controlled perimeter or attendee screening
Investigators also found UVU did not establish a comprehensive security perimeter around the outdoor event.
There were no temporary fences or barricades establishing controlled entrances, and no formal screening area. Bicycle racks near Kirk’s canopy were the only barriers, but the report said they were not intended to control entrances and exits.
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SECURITY CAMERAS WERE NOT MONITORED DURING EVENT
UVU had an existing network of surveillance cameras, access-control systems and other security technology, but the report found those resources were more effective after the shooting than before it.
“Security camera footage was valuable after the shooting, but no individual had been specifically assigned to monitor relevant camera feeds in real time for event security purposes,” investigators wrote.
Surveillance footage ultimately helped investigators track the alleged shooter’s movements after the attack.
The report recommends UVU consider video analytics capable of detecting people on rooftops or in other restricted areas and establish clear responsibility for monitoring cameras during major events.
UVU POLICE STAFFING
The review also raised broader concerns about the size of UVU’s police force.
UVUPD had 13 sworn officers, a staffing level investigators said was inadequate for the size of the university and the complexity of events held on campus.
“While a formal study is recommended to identify the appropriate staffing level, it was nevertheless clear to the Project Team that a total sworn staff of 13 is not sufficient for a university of UVU’s size and the types of events and activities occurring across its campus,” the report states.
The report recommends a formal analysis of staffing, pay, recruitment and retention.
Outside law enforcement agencies ultimately provided extensive assistance after the shooting, but those resources were not fully integrated into planning before Kirk’s appearance.
PREVIOUS EXERCISE SHOWED PROBLEMS
Some of the emergency-response concerns identified after Kirk’s shooting were not new.
UVU conducted an active-assailant tabletop exercise in January 2023 that identified communication and situational-awareness problems between the university’s Emergency Operations Center and its Policy Group. The earlier review recommended additional exercises.
“Several similar issues resurfaced on September 10,” the new report states, including problems with situational awareness, information sharing and uncertainty over who had decision-making authority.
Investigators concluded the recurrence “suggests that corrective actions from the 2023 exercise had not been fully implemented or validated before September 2025.”
Those problems became particularly apparent in the emergency notifications sent after Kirk was shot. The review found no immediate campus alert was activated by the police chief as incident commander, and later alerts included delays and contradictory information.
WHAT WORKED
The report did not characterize UVU’s entire response as a failure.
Investigators credited university personnel with responding under extraordinarily difficult circumstances and described the response from Orem police, fire personnel, state authorities, federal agencies and other partners as a strength.
The review also found UVU already had a “substantial foundation” of policies, emergency plans, committees, security technology and public safety resources.
The central problem, according to investigators, was putting those pieces together.
“The primary gap involved the translation of existing policies, structures, and capabilities into disciplined, repeatable, and documented practice for a controversial speaker and high-profile event involving elevated security considerations,” the report states.
The report includes dozens of recommendations covering event security, staffing, emergency communications, intelligence gathering, surveillance technology, training, mutual aid and the handling of future high-profile speakers.
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