CEXs are bleeding prediction in

Your apocalypse phone doesn’t need a cell tower. meet the Doomsday Phone, a DIY communicator called Chatter, powered by an ESP32 and LoRa radio it sends text messages directly to another compatible device within range no SIM card no Wi-Fi no mobile operator a built-in screen and physical buttons mean you don’t need to pair it with your smartphone the video claims up to 10 km of range, depending on terrain, obstacles and antennas its strength is simple: two powered devices can communicate without relying on a working mobile network for a camping trip, a remote location or a network outage, that could mean getting an “i’m safe” to someone who needs to hear it

Bitcoin Blood team 🩸

636606729769440499166579950236036751749912014371509557713570027508971809534551913252252094954941974952859310861988904737359709200557919 is a factor of RSA-896 saweis.net/posts/rsa-896.htm…

Strongly agree. When I verified Bitcoin Core 31.1 myself, I didn't stop at checking the SHA256 hash. I imported public PGP keys and verified signatures. More importantly, Bitcoin Core uses reproducible Guix builds: independent builders can build the same release on their own machines and attest that they arrived at the same binaries. Bitcoin Core 31.1 has Guix attestations from 16 independent builders: 0xb10c — github.com/0xb10c Emzy — github.com/Emzy Sjors — github.com/Sjors achow101 — github.com/achow101 benthecarman — github.com/benthecarman fanquake — github.com/fanquake guggero — github.com/guggero hebasto — github.com/hebasto m3dwards — github.com/m3dwards marcofleon — github.com/marcofleon pinheadmz — github.com/pinheadmz sedited — github.com/sedited sipsorcery — github.com/sipsorcery svanstaa — github.com/svanstaa theStack — github.com/theStack willcl-ark — github.com/willcl-ark That is a radically different trust model from simply checking a checksum published by the same party that gave you the binary. And frankly, it seems crazy to me that so much of the current discussion has shifted toward worrying about whether users need to generate their own randomness. We routinely trust general-purpose computers and modern operating systems to generate cryptographically strong passwords, passphrases and keys. Password managers do this every day. Anyone who has looked at how a modern OS seeds and maintains its CSPRNG knows that it continuously incorporates entropy from system and hardware events and exposes secure randomness once properly initialized. On a clean, freshly installed general-purpose OS, I am far more comfortable relying on a mature OS CSPRNG and well-reviewed cryptographic software than inventing my own entropy ceremony with dice. The bigger question for me is why we keep introducing specialized Bitcoin hardware in the first place. A device whose explicit purpose is securing Bitcoin creates targetedness. Manufacturers, payment processors, fulfillment companies, shipping providers and other third parties may now have economically valuable information about you: you probably own Bitcoin. If that data leaks, it can enable targeted phishing, social engineering, fake firmware or support messages, seed extraction attempts, SIM attacks, extortion or physical coercion — without anyone breaking the cryptography inside the device. The same trade-off exists with the current mantra of multi-vendor hardware-wallet multisig. Multisig can reduce key-compromise and correlated-device risk. But on the targetedness axis, every additional hardware-wallet vendor can add another manufacturer, customer database, supply chain, shipping provider, email system and specialized dependency to your threat model. If you wanted to create the biggest possible operational headache for yourself and your future heirs, one way would be to buy one device from every hardware-wallet vendor you can find. And there is certainly no shortage of them. You'd accumulate a huge specialized attack surface while repeatedly signaling to companies and their third-party providers that you are someone who takes Bitcoin custody seriously enough to buy dedicated signing devices. To me, that is completely backwards. Once you see the targetedness problem, you can't unsee it. My preference remains: Generic hardware. Linux. Bitcoin Core. Minimize specialized dependencies. Minimize targetedness. Minimize attack surface.

Introducing HashFly...the first organic neuron bitcoin miner based on the fly brain. Fun fact if this could be scaled on real organic neurons, it would hash at ~ 1 watt per terahash...10x the efficiency of the best silicon 3nm ASICs!

A real OpenTimestamps use case is quietly taking shape around AI compliance. The EU AI Act requires general purpose AI providers to publish summaries of their training content. An independent archive, GPAI Ledger, is preserving these disclosures with SHA-256 + OpenTimestamps proofs anchored to Bitcoin. The archive has already timestamped OpenAI’s GPT Image 2 disclosure. It’s an independent implementation for now, but it shows exactly where OTS can fit as AI compliance records become more important. digital-strategy.ec.europa.e… gpailedger.com/ gpailedger.com/ledger/openai… gpailedger.com/ledger/meta/m… @peterktodd @opentimestamps $TIME

You know how they say we only use 10% of our brain? Guess we are all mining bitcoin with 90% of it 😆

I did a full audit of Liquid's blockchain using elements-23.3.4 with "Range proof cache disabled via -norangeproofcache" from block 0 to 4054253 so I could independently verify that Liquid's blockchain contains no fraudulent LBTC or other assets and I got the correct chain tip 👍

To those responsible for the theft of bitcoin from the Liquid Network: Blockstream will not pay a ransom for the return of stolen funds. Taking assets without authorization and withholding their return is a crime, not responsible disclosure. It is not white-hat activity. It is theft. We have engaged in good faith in an effort to secure the return of stolen user funds and protect the broader Bitcoin community. That effort should not be mistaken for acceptance of the actions taken nor of the terms being demanded. We will not be a party to the precedent that open-source software developed for the good of the Bitcoin community should subject its developers to paying a ransom that far exceeds their economic participation. Bitcoin is hard money and can’t be minted without costs, Bitcoin doesn’t haircut users to pay a ransom. To the Bitcoin community: We are fighting for what we believe in, for the users whose funds were taken, and for the principles on which Bitcoin was built. The community has demonstrated incredible resolve with teams of people dedicating their time in support of each other to identify and patch vulnerabilities in each other's products and systems. We are all driven by the mission that Bitcoin is the single best asset, for every person, company, and institution on the planet to invest, use, and build on. The world is a different place with the advancements of AI, and the Bitcoin community has responded with force to combat that threat. Damage has been done, battles have been lost, but on the whole the Bitcoin community is gaining ground in the war with bad actors. We want to thank the community for those efforts, for your support in hardening the network, helping users recover funds, and for your support in our assertion that crime does not deserve rewards. To those holding the stolen bitcoin: There is still an opportunity to resolve this responsibly. The bitcoin can be returned and we can revert to the standard of white-hat principals. However, if the funds are not returned, we will pursue every lawful avenue available to us. We will work with law enforcement, exchanges, service providers, forensic specialists, and other relevant parties to trace and recover the assets and identify those responsible. More importantly, Bitcoin is transparent by design and the community is made up of the most sophisticated engineers, cryptographers, and white-hat hackers globally. Transactions do not disappear, and neither does the evidence they leave behind. We will not pay for the return of stolen property. We will not abandon our users. The Bitcoin community will not stop pursuing the funds. Return the bitcoin.

No, this is evil. Governments are definitely going to get special abilities to fake photos through mechanisms like this. Because they can get secret access to Apple's signing keys. Tools like @opentimestamps are the only democratic way to prove authenticity.

Scammers are thriving right now. Don't Trust, Verify.

gpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc is easily bypassable for detached signatures. The correct command requires the data file: gpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc SHA256SUMS This appears to be a common mistake. Without the second argument, gpg succeeds even if the .asc file contains an arbitrary embedded message rather than signing the actual SHA256SUMS file. It prints a warning, but it's easily missed in gpg's output. The gpg manpage explicitly discourages the single-argument form, keeping it only for backward compatibility. I actually keep a list of gpg pitfalls. This is number 8. Mehdi Kerimov reported this in nix-bitcoin's self-updater via @nixbitcoinorg's bounty program. We had originally followed bitcoincore.org verification instructions, which had the same issue and have since been fixed. That this sat unnoticed on @bitcoincoreorg since 2018 shows just how little-known this footgun is. It's unlikely bad signatures were ever published at scale, as anyone noticing the warning or using the two-argument command would have caught it immediately.

Two kids.. I cook 7 days a week. I still write the code. No own a house. The job is open source. No box. Low money. Low time. Laptop. Omarchy. No robot. No car. BTC. Building a better future. That’s my fuel. 38 on paper. 83 in my head.

Privacy, as a human right, has to have many faces defending it and speaking out for it. In today’s world, nobody will give you your rights without your effort; you have to be ready to defend them every single day. Let’s do it together!

the Simple the ₿etter

This "problem" fucking stupid: wallets should have defined a standard where they backup the descriptor to the Bitcoin chain in encrypted form, e.g. in an OP_Return or taproot annex. For a wallet that is actually used, the descriptor backup would be a tiny % of chain space used.

those who don't understand internet physics, are doomed to learn John Gilmore's quote the hard way. "The internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around it" -John Gilmore (cyherpunks list co-founder)

"Veni, vidi, forki" -Julius Dashjr