Surface Warfare Officer (U.S. Navy) in DC. Six years in Japan, two years in China. Episcopalian. Johns Hopkins SAIS/HNC alum. 中文/日本語 🏳️‍🌈🇺🇦🇹🇼

Washington, DC
Honored to support the @NavalWarCollege’s @ChinaMaritime Studies Institute (#CMSI) from the very beginning! Two decades on, we are analyzing a very different array of PRC military maritime developments from when we started… From CMSI Director CAPT @ChrisHSharman, @USNavy (Ret.): #China #Military Maritime Watchers— Twenty years ago, the Navy created a small institute at the Naval War College to focus on PRC military maritime issues. Its approach was distinctive: use China’s own scholarship and professional journals to better understand how the PLA thinks, plans, and operates in the military maritime domain. Two decades later, that mission has never been more important. Today, the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) commemorates 20 years as an official Navy program and two decades of research, education, and engagement focused on China’s military maritime development. CMSI traces its origins to a group of Naval War College faculty who recognized the need for a dedicated effort to better understand China’s growing military maritime power. Established within the College in 2004 and formally launched as an official Navy program in 2006, CMSI became the Department of Defense’s first service-level Professional Military Education (PME) China center. Over the past two decades, CMSI has sought to do something that remains central to our mission today: conduct rigorous research on China’s military maritime forces and provide penetrating insights that are relevant to the U.S. Navy, the @DeptofWar, and national security decision-makers. We were honored to mark this milestone with a special lecture today at the Naval War College by former CNO Admiral Gary Roughead and former CMSI Director Dr. @peter_dutton, who shared their perspectives on CMSI and its development.  Twenty years is an important milestone, but the mission is even more pressing than ever.  We are proud of where CMSI has been and even more focused on where the next twenty years will take us. >>> Click here to read my personal reflection on CMSI’s founding and subsequent evolution: andrewerickson.com/2024/10/c…
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Jackie this seems a little unfair... Yes, China is doing a lot of unsavory things. That's exactly why though we need people who have studied there, speak the language, understand the CCP, the culture, the history... We cannot effectively plan against an entity we don't understand
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This extraordinary WSJ article details the many ways China has enabled Iran during OEF. China may say it wants to play peacemaker in the Middle East, yet it indirectly participates in the war. I hope the U.S. imposes real consequences for this behavior. wsj.com/politics/china-iran-…
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Will Yale retweeted
I’m usually not attacked for being naive on China. But I believe strongly in sending students, with appropriate protections, to China. I was one of these students. I cannot see why our piece should be controversial, but realize there are some who believe all exchanges should be halted. I am not among them. Here is our argument: -Longstanding federal programs that encourage US students to learn about China — like Fulbright, CLS, and Boren — should be funded by the US government. We had similar exchanges with the Soviets, and of course with China, in the past. - Given growing risks to students in China, those participating in these programs must be protected from harassment or threats of arbitrary detention, which are growing, and which are why these programs were difficult to renew in the past. - But there is a way out. Summits provide an opportunity to achieve commitments that protect these programs and their students. Trump should (1) elevate these programs into leader-level deliverables, and (2) reach formal (or, more likely, informal) agreements to insulate them from politics. The former sends a signal not to touch these programs and the latter sustains it. - As part of this effort, Min Zin and other scholars and students arbitrarily detained or exit banned by China must be released. - We did not write this in the piece, but obviously these efforts should be accompanied by proper orientation and training for students before they visit China. That was also the case for these programs in the past. It is more criticism now. We have done all this before. It has worked before too. Leader-level recognition of certain programs in China can provide protection. The US desperately needs China expertise. After a surge among millennials, what expertise we did have faces a cliff as students lose interest in and opportunities for studying China and Chinese. That is a problem.
This new @CFR_org "Expert Take" on student exchanges with China is so flawed I had to read it twice to find something nice to say. Here goes: At least the authors acknowledge that American students who travel to China need protection, and that the CCP should immediately release detained academics such as Min Zin and Youlin Chen. Small mercies. Beyond these pro forma nods to reality, the piece's omission of China-side context speaks volumes: --The authors effectively support the CCP's "50,000 in 5 years" drive to recruit US students without once mentioning it. Announced by Xi Jinping in 2023, this initiative has reportedly already reached its target but continues because its architects believe it provides such upside to the CCP. --Similarly, in 1,100-plus words, the authors manage not a single mention of the united front apparatus, which plays a critical role fronting for Chinese intelligence and conducting political warfare on the PRC side of educational exchanges. They do not mention the CCP emphasis on leveraging foreign students to advance propaganda and economic goals, including attracting other countries' capital and technology while encouraging their governments' complacency. --Finally, they find no occasion to mention the CCP's surveillance and transnational repression of Chinese students inside the United States, a growing threat not only to these students but also to US sovereignty. In fairness, the authors have to leave out these inconvenient details so they can advance their completely backward proposal. At a time when the CCP is energetically recruiting (or luring) American students in order to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the United States, the authors do NOT suggest cutting off these flows. Rather, they argue that President Trump should negotiate with General Secretary Xi to secure "implicit assurances" not to detain or surveil US students in China so that we can send even more students. As if today's CCP intelligence state, which is all too active even on US soil, might be willing to "insulate from competitive dynamics" programs on their own soil that allow them to surveil and shape some of the Americans they're most interested in surveilling and shaping. This is as shrewd as telling the car salesman that there's no other car for you than the one you test drove, the only thing it's missing is an extended warranty, and you feel like you've known him forever. Just astonishingly counter-strategic from a US perspective - but helpful to the CCP. Sadly, it's typical of the arguments that have gotten the United States to the place where we find ourselves, having ceded so many of our advantages to the CCP through compliant engagement over decades. In this case, compliant engagement includes hand-waving about "understanding" (citing the example of a scholar who visited, and left, China before the CCP took over as evidence for the need to be on the ground in 2026) and regurgitating CCP slogans such as "people-to-people diplomacy." All while avoiding the aforementioned grubby and impolite - but stubborn! - facts essential to even a basic understanding of the situation. It's not as if the authors don't know any better. One of them moderated a CFR event last year where the speaker said: "And then there’s research in China by Americans. It’s very difficult. First of all, we only have 900 American students in the whole country right now. Being a student in China is not easy. Being a scholar trying to do research, the kind I’ve had to do, I’ve been a resident fellow in six different Chinese Academy of Social Sciences institutes in my career—six, more than any other foreigner I’m aware of. Well, that’s not possible today. You can’t go be a resident fellow in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, or any other place. And much less do interviews, archival research, libraries, field work. Just basic scholarly research. Can’t do it. That’s what I mean. Xi Jinping has securitized scholarship, amongst other things..." The other co-author - unsurprisingly - runs a non-profit that has for many years worked directly with CCP united front bodies, and lists a united front official as an advisor on its website. So... I will stand by for the inevitable exasperated sighs and ad feminam insults that seem to substitute for intelligent debate on this subject by defenders of the status quo. Cheers!
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Will Yale retweeted
The Air Force is slashing all civilian positions at its premier research institute for Chinese military aviation, prompting concern among experts who say it will dilute the service’s focus on the Pentagon’s most significant long-term adversary. airandspaceforces.com/air-fo…
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This story highlights two facts about the U.S. military supply system: 1) that it frequently utilizes commercial carriers to move parts; and 2) that the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin maintain centralized control over all F-35 parts. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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Will Yale retweeted
The discourse will get even more entertaining when Xi actually does bring back the Party Chairman title. If there were a polymarket on that I would put a lot of $$ on that happening by the end of the 21st Party Congress
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An additional thought on the USAF decision to eliminate CASI’s civilian billets. What we don’t know is what happens to CASI contracts with BluePath Labs. Why does this matter? It matters because at least a third of CASI’s long form research has been produced by BluePath. And this understates their contribution, since its work has also included things like research support, data/knowledge-management tools, media support, and other sorts of activities that don’t necessarily result in a publication. From 2017–2026, Air Force awards/task orders associated with BluePath’s support to CASI exceeded $6 million. So even if CASI’s research budget is cut, this does not mean BluePath is going away. CASI has accounted for a relatively small portion of BluePath’s overall revenue, maybe between 5-10%. BluePath supports a much wider range of USG customers, including DoD, DHS, DOE, and Commerce. So presumably, the very talented pool of China analysts within BluePath will remain intact. @will_yale @conanwhatisbest @matthew_brazil @BluePathLabs @GeraldC_Brown @AndrewSErickson
Replying to @will_yale
This RAND study, entitled “Building the Knowledge and Skills the U.S. Air Force Needs for Strategic Competition with China,” was published in April 2026. It may be relevant. It’s worth noting that RAND’s Project Air Force has supported the Air Force for decades. A couple of years ago, RAND brought onboard one of CASI’s star analysts, who served concurrently as Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Here’s a notable excerpt from the RAND study: “Although CASI plays a central role in advancing understanding of China’s aerospace capabilities and has contributed valuable research and PME content, challenges limit its effectiveness. CASI has succeeded in producing high-quality analysis and educating segments of the PME community; however, its broader impact is hindered by limited visibility, resourcing, and integration with career pathways. Without deliberate efforts to increase awareness and embed CASI outputs into USAF talent management systems, its contributions risk being underutilized.” rand.org/pubs/research_repor…
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Will Yale retweeted
Replying to @RadioFreeTom
Or we make the Space Force part of the Navy, since the Navy and the Space Force have a more symbiotic relationship than almost any other two services save the Navy and Marine Corps
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This is a very bad move! It sends a signal to Beijing that the US isn’t really serious about deterring Beijing. “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War
The US Air Force is shutting down CASI (China Aerospace Studies Institute), its dedicated open-source think tank on China's military aerospace forces. CASI has been one of the most prolific public sources of PLA research in the US; publishing hundreds of studies, running officer courses, and supporting wargames. The PLA-studies community is calling it "devastating" and "a massive own-goal."
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Will Yale retweeted
Yes, effectively closing down China Aerospace Studies Institute is stupid. Beijing will be delighted. One hopes USAF Chief of Staff will reverse this decision, and perhaps find another career path for the person(s) who thought it was a good idea. @clashreport
This is a very bad move! It sends a signal to Beijing that the US isn’t really serious about deterring Beijing. “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War
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私はCASIの研究者らとは頻繁に意見交換をしていますが、間違いなく中国軍研究では世界トップレベル。中国語の一次資料を読み込み、人民解放軍の空軍・宇宙軍・ロケット軍の編成や教義を公開情報から解き明かしてきた米軍で唯一の専門機関です。その報告書は米軍内だけでなく、日本を含む同盟国の研究者や実務家にも広く参照されてきました。 その閉鎖対中インテリジェンス能力にとって深刻な自殺行為と言わざるを得ません。失われるのは組織ではなく人です。空軍は「軍人が任務を引き継ぐ」と説明しますが、残るのは曹長2人と空席の中佐ポストだけです。中国語で解放軍の内部文書を読み解く分析官は一朝一夕には育たず、2〜3年で異動する軍人では10年かけて蓄積した知見の継承はほぼできません。中国側の資料はむしろ年々手に入れられなくなっており、この空白を埋める代替手段は米軍内に存在しません。しかも習近平主席の訪米直前という時期での発表。台湾への140億ドル武器売却の凍結と合わせ、対中融和を優先して軍の「中国を敵として研究する機能」を弱める流れの一環と受け止められても仕方がありません。 日本への含意は明確です。米国の対中分析が細るなら、日本が自前の公開情報分析能力を強化し、CASIの人材やノウハウを受け入れる同盟の受け皿になることを真剣に検討すべきです。 npx.me/v2/33LBV2/MMKi?from=t…
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The announced closure of CASI is deeply concerning, particularly when expertise on China’s military capabilities and strategic thinking is increasingly important. It also risks weakening critical analytical capacity across the USAF and the US Armed Forces as a whole.
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Will Yale retweeted
Dude. You tell me this now?!
One of my big takeaways from this whole experience is that you should avoid cancer if you can manage it. It is not nearly as fun as everybody says.
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Will Yale retweeted
I think you’re missing the point. My post is not about increasing lethality among 0-6s gunning for their star. It’s the hypothetical from the congressman that more competent general and flag officers automatically equates to a better political decision.
Literally not the point of the JWE. You’re being salty for no reason and it’s coming across as uselessly petty. You don’t have to score partisan political points. You can just enjoy it. You’re allowed.
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