It is misleading to say Iran simply wants to “return to the June MOU.” Tehran’s position is better understood as a demand that the MOU actually be implemented, and in a different sequence.
The agreement was indeed relatively favorable to Iran: it called for an end to the regional war, explicitly mentioning Lebanon; access to frozen Iranian assets; an end to the U.S. naval blockade; ending threats; and recognized Iranian arrangements for restoring Hormuz traffic.
But from Tehran’s perspective, the United States never delivered. Iranian assets remained frozen, the Israeli war on Lebanon continued, U.S. threats didn’t stop, and Washington pursued a separate southern shipping corridor and discouraged others from using the Iranian route.
Iran’s subsequently return to attacking tankers using the U.S. route, which reflected Tehran’s conclusion that the post-MOU trajectory was moving in the wrong strategic direction.
Iranian leaders concluded that continuing to de-escalate while hoping for U.S. compliance would leave Iran economically isolated, erode its leverage over Hormuz, and entrench a U.S. and Israeli perception that further pressure, and even more attacks, could be imposed at manageable cost.
That is the crucial difference today. Iran is not offering a deal and easing pressure first in exchange for promises that Washington will eventually fulfill the MOU. It wants U.S. implementation upfront: release the assets, end the blockade and wider war, and recognize the Iran-Oman Hormuz arrangement. Only then is Iran saying that it will ease its own pressure and support normalizing traffic through the strait.
Whether Washington accepts that sequencing is the central question. But describing Iran’s position simply as a “return to the MOU” obscures what the past several months have actually been about: who moves first, and whether Iran gives up its leverage before or after the United States delivers its obligations under the deal.