🇪🇹 Tigrayan forces said Tuesday that they killed more than 1,500 Ethiopian troops in two days of fighting in northern Ethiopia's Tigray region. 🔹Negash Hiluf, spokesman for the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), said Tigrayan fighters ambushed federal troops near Mirena on Oct. 17 and 18. The government units were trying to push toward Adet, in central Tigray. He said 1,511 Ethiopian soldiers were killed and 1,050 wounded. He also said the Tigray Peace Force, a pro-government militia, suffered 11 casualties. The figures have not been independently verified, and the Ethiopian government has not responded to them. 🔹Shortly after the TPLF statement, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed warned neighboring Eritrea against backing anti-government fighters. He accused Eritrea of harboring hostile groups that threaten Ethiopia's stability and urged it to choose economic partnership over confrontation. He warned that ignoring Ethiopia's peace overtures would carry severe consequences. 🔹Eritrea denies any military involvement. It has voiced concern that Ethiopia wants its Red Sea ports. Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea's independence in 1993. 🔹The latest fighting comes after TPLF fighters withdrew from Adwa, a town about 25 miles from the Eritrean border, toward the border town of Rama. Federal forces had already captured Mekelle, Tigray's capital, earlier this month and set up a temporary administration in the region. By contributor Godfrey Olukya

Contrasting Eritrea’s Sovereign Foreign Policy with Ethiopia’s Expansionism in the Horn of Africa The geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa has once again reached a dangerous crossroads. At the heart of this unfolding crisis lies a fundamental confrontation: on one side stand the core principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and sovereign equality; on the other lies an aggressive political agenda, driven by UAE led axis that is increasingly centered on maritime entitlement, historical revisionism, and the projection of regional power. This clash of visions has been brought into stark relief by the sharp deterioration of relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The escalation reached a critical threshold on October 1, 2026, when Ethiopia decided to close its embassy in Asmara and expel ten Eritrean diplomats, a move swiftly followed by Eritrea’s decision to take reciprocal decision and severe diplomatic relations entirely. In mainstream Western and corporate media discourse, the complex friction points of the region are frequently flattened into a generalized narrative of mutual intransigence. However, drawing upon regional policy analyses and investigative perspectives a vastly different reality emerges. This analysis explores the fundamental dichotomy between Eritrea’s consistent foreign policy of defensive sovereignty, regional partnership, and non-interference, and Ethiopia’s historical and contemporary trajectory of destabilizing expansionism, internal volatility, and projection of external grievances. This crisis cannot be understood solely as a diplomatic disagreement over port facilities or commercial access to maritime routes as main stream media would have you believe. It must be examined against the increasingly forceful rhetoric emanating from Ethiopia’s political leadership concerning sovereign access to the Red Sea, historical rights, Ethiopia’s former maritime position, and the strategic importance of the Eritrean coastline. The central question is whether Ethiopia’s declared objective is confined to securing reliable commercial access through negotiated arrangements or whether influential elements within its political and military establishment envisage a more ambitious transformation of the regional territorial order. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the leadership of the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) have repeatedly described sovereign sea access as an existential national necessity. At various points, they have also tried to cloak their warped ambition in the language of peaceful negotiation, mutual benefit, and respect for neighbouring states’ sovereignty. They must be examined alongside statements invoking historical entitlement, the alleged inevitability of maritime access, the possible use of force, and the security of the Red Sea extending toward Eritrean ports. It is the tension between these positions, not any single statement in isolation that demands serious regional and international scrutiny. Eritrea’s position is fundamentally different. Its foreign policy rests on the defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and the principle that no state, regardless of population or economic weight, possesses a superior entitlement to another nation’s territory. From Eritrea’s perspective, Ethiopia’s landlocked status may constitute an economic and logistical challenge, but it cannot serve as a legal justification for coercion, territorial revisionism, or the unilateral alteration of internationally recognized borders. This position is further reinforced by the historical record. Even following the outbreak of the Eritrea–Ethiopia border war in May 1998, Eritrea did not block or obstruct Ethiopia’s access to its port facilities at Assab and Massawa. Rather, it was the Ethiopian government that voluntarily chose to boycott Eritrean ports and redirect its maritime trade through Djibouti. Claims that Ethiopia’s landlocked status constitutes an existential condition imposed by its coastal neighbours are therefore contradicted by Ethiopia’s own historical experience. At various points, Ethiopia has also explored or pursued alternative maritime access arrangements involving Port Sudan, the port of Tadjoura in Djibouti, and Kenya’s Lamu port, underscoring that its maritime options have never been confined exclusively to Eritrea. I. Eritrea’s Sovereign Foreign Policy and the Principles of International Law Eritrea’s foreign policy has been profoundly shaped by its protracted liberation struggle and an enduring determination to preserve national independence against external domination. Since achieving independence in 1993, Eritrea has consistently maintained that the viability and legitimacy of a sovereign state do not depend on its physical size, population, or strategic resource endowments. Rather, sovereign viability rests on the fundamental rights of its people, the inviolability of its territorial integrity, and its capacity to conduct independent international relations based on mutual respect and sovereign equality. In the immediate post-independence era, Eritrea actively participated in regional institution-building, notably contributing to the revitalization and development of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Its diplomatic approach emphasizes regional economic cooperation, structural complementarity, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, principles that are vital in the Horn of Africa, a region historically burdened by external interventions, geopolitical rivalries, and structural fragmentation. Eritrea’s commitment to regional peace and diplomacy is reflected in its sustained engagements across the Horn of Africa over three decades. In July 1994, Eritrea played a central early role in diplomatic efforts to resolve the Sudanese conflict, contributing significantly to the formulation and signing of the IGAD Declaration of Principles on Sudan. When conflict erupted between 1998 and 2000, on a putative border dispute, Eritrea sought a definitive resolution grounded in international law. On 12 December 2000, the parties signed the landmark Algiers Agreement, establishing a binding legal framework to end hostilities and resolve outstanding issues. Pursuant to this treaty, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission issued its final and binding delimitation decision on 13 April 2002 under applicable international law, an enduring legal record formally published in the Reports of International Arbitral Awards. For Eritrea, this process extended beyond frontier demarcation; it embodied the imperative principle that territorial disputes must be resolved through agreed legal procedures rather than unilateral assertions of historical entitlement or political hegemony. Leveraging its diplomatic mediation capacity, Eritrea hosted and facilitated peace negotiations in Asmara that culminated in the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement in October 2006, ending years of armed conflict in eastern Sudan. In May 2007, Eritrea hosted contact group meetings that successfully de-escalated tensions and normalized relations between Chad and Sudan. Later that same year, in September 2007, Asmara convened the National Reconciliation Conference for Somalia, bringing together key political stakeholders to deliberate on state reconstitution and national unity. In the following decade, Eritrea broadened its multilateral engagement in human security and regional reconciliation. In 2014, Eritrea became a founding core member of the African Union–Horn of Africa Initiative on Countering Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons (the Khartoum Process), ultimately assuming the Chairmanship of the initiative in 2019. Furthermore, between 2018 and 2019, Eritrea facilitated critical peace agreements between the Ethiopian federal government and various armed opposition movements, enabling their peaceful return to Ethiopia to foster national reconciliation and broader regional stability. Eritrea’s posture regarding the Red Sea is governed by these same principles of international law and sovereign equality. The Red Sea must function as a secure international corridor for trade, maritime transit, and peaceful economic communication, rather than an arena for geopolitical competition or territorial encroachment. Maritime security and jurisdiction in the Red Sea rest on cooperation among its legitimate coastal states in strict accordance with established international law. A landlocked state cannot convert its demographic size, economic ambition, or lack of direct maritime access into a special legal entitlement over the sovereign territory, coastline, or security arrangements of its coastal neighbors. Regional stability cannot be built on unilateral claims or strategic coercion, but must rest firmly on mutual respect, territorial integrity, and the sovereign equality of all states. II. Historical Revisionism and the Ideological Construction of "Sovereign Access" Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime trade and logistical access is, in principle, a standard economic objective. Landlocked states possess well-defined rights of transit and access to maritime routes applicable to appropriate bilateral agreements under international law. However, a legal and strategic controversy arises when a state deliberately blurs the distinction between commercial port usage and the assertion of territorial sovereignty over foreign coastlines, a revisionist position supported by neither international legal precedent nor treaty law. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, this conceptual distortion has become a central pillar of Ethiopian state strategy. The PP has increasingly deployed arguments rooted in historical nostalgia, demographic weight, and existential geographic disadvantage to construct a legal pretense for territorial overreach. • Early 2023: Normalizing Irredentist Claims Beginning in late 2022, Ethiopian strategic discourse shifted from routine trade logistics toward asserting a "natural and historical right" to the Red Sea. By framing maritime access in terms of historic entitlement and regional dominance, narratives that are both historically unfounded and legally invalid, the PP laid the ideological groundwork to contest Eritrea’s sovereignty. From Eritrea’s perspective, this signaled a clear transition: Ethiopia was no longer merely seeking negotiating commercial access, but preparing political conditions to challenge international borders. • 13 October 2023: Deploying "Existential Necessity" as Coercive Strategy Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s address to parliament on 13 October 2023 marked a formal escalation in this campaign. By branding Ethiopia a “prisoner of geography” and elevating Red Sea access to an “existential imperative,” the ruling party framed its landlocked status not as a geographical reality to be managed through bilateral trade, but as an existential injustice to be rectified. While official media later sought to qualify these statements by referencing peaceful negotiations, the strategic damage was already done. Weaponizing the concept of "existential necessity" creates a dangerous precedent, implying that a state's economic ambitions or demographic size can supersede the territorial integrity of its neighbors. Core Principles of State Sovereignty: 1.Geographical land-lockedness creates no legal right to foreign territory. 2.Demographic size confers no superior entitlement under international law. 3.Nostalgic mythmaking and manufactured historical narratives confer absolutely zero legal authority to alter recognized international borders. Attempts to deploy such narratives are doubly invalid here, as the historical claims being peddled are factually absurd and demonstrably false. Historical narratives confer no authority to revise recognized international borders, especially when, as in this case, the narrative itself is factually baseless. 14 November 2023: Tactical Reassurances amid Creeping Destabilization In November 2023, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed publicly dismissed concerns that Ethiopia intended to violate Eritrean sovereignty, claiming his party sought maritime access solely through legal mechanisms, commercial deals, and economic concessions like equity in Ethiopian Airlines or the GERD. While presented as a peaceful diplomatic overture, this assurance functioned as a tactical effort to neutralize regional alarm while laying the groundwork for more aggressive postures. The stark contrast between these formal reassurances and Ethiopia’s subsequent rhetoric, which reframed sea access as a non-negotiable historical destiny, reveals a calculated strategy to normalize expansionist ambitions under the guise of economic cooperation. 2023: Symbolic Expansionism and Irredentist Signal-Sending Concurrent with diplomatic disclaimers, regional and military actors within Ethiopia began actively projecting expansionist symbolism toward the Red Sea throughout 2023. Declarations by the President of the Oromia Regional State asserting that the 2024 Irreechaa festival would be celebrated on the Red Sea coast, within the sovereign territory of a neighboring state, served as a deliberate ideological provocation. Compounded by Ethiopian military officials displaying maps that absorbed Assab and Eritrea’s southern coastline into Ethiopia, these actions demonstrated that rhetoric surrounding maritime access was backed by irredentist signaling designed to contest established international borders. The "Two Waters" Concept: Strategic Ambition and Regional Instability A central driver of Ethiopia’s increasingly destabilizing regional motives is the emerging “Two Waters” doctrine, a framework that geopolitically links the Nile Basin to the Red Sea. While presented under the guise of economic integration and maritime access, the concept serves as a broader strategic vehicle for projecting Ethiopian hegemony across the Horn of Africa. Rather than fostering genuine economic cooperation, this dual-water strategy functions as a pretext to undermine the territorial integrity of neighboring states. Although public declarations stop short of explicitly codifying an official plan to annex Eritrean territory, the doctrine’s strategic implications are unmistakable: it systematically conflates commercial access with historic rights and security domain authority. Ultimately, regional strategic narratives must not serve as a cover for eroding state sovereignty or disrupting the precarious stability of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor. III. From Negotiated Access to Historical Entitlement: The Developments of 2024–2025 1 January 2024: The Ethiopia–Somaliland MoU as a Catalyst for Regional Instability Ethiopia’s unilateral Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland on 1 January 2024 significantly escalated regional tensions, directly challenging Somalia’s sovereignty and setting a dangerous precedent across the Horn of Africa. While focused on Somaliland, the agreement sent a clear signal to neighboring states, including Eritrea, that Ethiopia was willing to bypass established international law to secure maritime footholds. The crisis underscored how Ethiopian strategy dangerously blurs the boundary between legitimate commercial port leases and unilateral attempts to alter sovereign territorial arrangements, threatening to ignite competing jurisdictional claims across the Red Sea corridor. 2024: Codifying Maritime Ambition as an Expansionist Imperative Throughout 2024, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed elevated sea access from an economic ambition to an existential, generational objective. By framing maritime access as a core element of Ethiopia’s strategic identity, it signaled that its geopolitical drive would not be constrained by existing international borders. For Eritrea and the broader region, this shift confirmed that Ethiopia was not merely seeking commercial port access, but was laying the ideological groundwork to demand sovereign rights over coastal territories, a revisionist proposition that directly undermines regional stability. August 2025: The Prosperity Party’s Rhetorical Escalation: From Access to "Historical Rights" In August 2025, the ruling Prosperity Party Council formally institutionalized this aggressive trajectory, adopting resolutions that declared access to the Red Sea a “natural and historical right” necessary to restore Ethiopia’s regional dominance. Moving beyond the Prime Minister’s rhetoric into formal party doctrine, this shift transformed a practical trade issue into a revanchist political claim over neighboring territories. However, historical narrative cannot override contemporary state sovereignty, nor does prior historical association grant a landlocked state an enforceable entitlement to annex sovereign Eritrean territory. September 2025: Peaceful Rhetoric as a Means of Normalizing Revisionist Demands At the launch of his book The Medemer State in September 2025, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed reiterated his characterization of Ethiopia as a “geographical prisoner,” asserting that the country would not remain landlocked. While invoking peaceful negotiations and economic dialogue, the statement framed landlockedness as an existential injustice that must be rectified. Under the guise of peaceful engagement, this strategy systematically forces coastal states into negotiating away sovereign rights under the implicit threat that Ethiopia's ambition will be realized regardless of diplomatic consent. 27 October 2025: Categorical Rhetoric and the Escalation to Maximalist Claims Rhetoric escalated sharply on 27 October 2025 when Abiy declared he was "a million percent certain" that Ethiopia would secure Red Sea access. This shift to absolute certainty signaled a refusal to accept the geopolitical status quo, converting a policy objective into an unyielding national mandate. By adopting such an unequivocal position, the ruling party risked narrowing the space for conventional diplomacy, which depends on negotiation, mutual consent, and respect for sovereignty in securing commercial access, in favour of mounting pressure on coastal neighbours to accept arrangements that could entail concessions over sovereign rights. 7 November 2025: General Bacha Debele and the Normalization of Military Coercion The discourse took a dangerous turn in November 2025 with statements surrounding Ambassador General Bacha Debele, which introduced the posture of pursuing sovereign access "through negotiations if possible, and by force if necessary." Whether framed as explicit official policy or calculated psychological warfare, circulating the threat of military force against a sovereign nation violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. By allowing threats of military action against Eritrean territorial integrity to enter mainstream debate, Ethiopia has deliberately destabilized the Horn of Africa and normalized military coercion as an instrument of statecraft. IV. Historical Revisionism and the Escalation of Military Rhetoric Late 2025: Revisionist Rhetoric and the Delegitimization of Eritrean Sovereignty In late 2025, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed directly challenged the historical foundation of Eritrean statehood, alleging during a parliamentary address that no official documentation exists to explain how Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia transpired. By attempting to erase the well-established historical reality of Eritrean statehood, rooted in the colonial treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908, forged through a thirty-year liberation struggle, and sealed when Eritrea gained Independence in 1991, Ethiopia crossed a dangerous threshold. This rhetoric signaled a deliberate shift toward historical revisionism, seeking to frame contemporary international borders as mere political accidents and laying the ideological groundwork to contest Eritrean sovereignty. Late 2025: The Golan Heights Analogy and Unilateral Territorial Seizure The Prime Minister’s revisionist narrative was further reinforced by reported parliamentary references to Israel’s annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights as a precedent for Ethiopia’s maritime pursuit. Invoking forcible annexation as a model for resolving landlocked status represents an explicit rejection of international legal norms. By equating economic desire with territorial entitlement, the PP signaled that it views unilateral territorial acquisition as a viable policy option, a stance that directly violates the United Nations Charter. January 2026: Normalizing War as a Means for Coastal Acquisition Rhetoric escalated to explicit belligerence in January 2026, when the PM declared: “If we have to fight, it has to be for a good cause, and the Red Sea cause is a good reason”. This statement stripped away remaining diplomatic ambiguities, explicitly framing the forcible acquisition of sovereign maritime access as a casus belli. Transforming an economic topic into an explicit justification for war completely dismantled prior peaceful assurances and exposed an aggressive, expansionist doctrine targeting coastal neighbors. 3 February 2026: Demographic Entitlement and Specific Territorial Demands Addressing the House of Peoples’ Representatives on 3 February 2026, Abiy asserted that Ethiopia and the Red Sea are “inseparable entities” and specified a demand for approximately 50 kilometers of coastline. By contrasting Ethiopia's 130-million population with the smaller populations of Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia, the PP deployed a doctrine of demographic entitlement to subvert international law. Demanding a specific coastal strip while cloaking it in talks of land swaps or joint use does not alter the underlying threat: it represents a coercive demand for sovereign territory, forcing neighbors like Eritrea to defend their recognized borders against expansionist pressure. 22 February 2026: Unilateral Security Claims and Military Overreach Toward Massawa At a Special Forces ceremony in Hawassa on 22 February 2026, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed asserted that Ethiopian military power would secure the Red Sea corridor extending from Somalia to the Eritrean port city of Massawa. By unilaterally projecting a military security mantle over the sovereign territory and coastlines of neighboring sovereign states, specifically Eritrea and Somalia, Ethiopia laid claim to extraterritorial security authority. This declaration marked a dangerous evolution in Ethiopian policy: shifting from demands for commercial access to asserting a right of military dominance and intervention across foreign maritime jurisdictions without international mandate or host-nation consent.

The Thaw in U.S.-Ethiopia Relations Has Gone Far Enough New FDD Policy Brief from @EFittonBrown & Grant Wishard: bit.ly/4dKUOvQ

Eyewitnesses from #Eritrea tell of full mobilisation in several #Eritrean cities, government agents using loudspeakers for males and females to attend meetings to defend their country.

The reality of the situation - Eritrea allegedly calls for full war mobilisation in preparation for what to come. A tragedy in the making for the people of both Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Our EBRF leaders Beyene Gerezgiher and Dawit Yibrah met with Ali Yassin, chairperson of the Red Sea Afar movement, to strengthen cooperation among Eritrean justice seekers working for democratic change. Together they assessed Eritrea's political situation and the wider region, and agreed that unity, coordinated action and joint mobilisation are needed to end the rule of Isaias Afwerki and the PFDJ. Both sides will meet again to build shared plans and deeper coordination. We in EBRF stand with the Afar people and every Eritrean force ready to open the prisons. EBRF has a plan for a democratic transition through regime change in Asmara. @BeyeneGerezghe1 @martinplaut @KjetilTronvoll @CmaDawit #EBRF #BlueRevolution #RegimeChange #Eritrea #RSAMC

#𝐒𝐓𝐑𝐄𝐍𝐆𝐓𝐇𝐄𝐍𝐈𝐍𝐆: ⭕️ 𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗗𝗶𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗙𝗼𝘂𝗿-𝗪𝗮𝘆 𝗖𝗮𝗶𝗿𝗼 𝗦𝘂𝗺𝗺𝗶𝘁 𝗥𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗮𝗹? Former Minister of Information, Culture and Awareness of the Republic of Somaliland, Hon. @AliHassanMoham, a senior figure in KULMIYE, the oldest and largest opposition party in the Republic of Somaliland, has published an article examining the double standards in Somalia’s Regime President @HassanSMohamud’s political stance and the implications of the four-way Cairo Summit, titled: "𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗗𝗶𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗙𝗼𝘂𝗿-𝗪𝗮𝘆 𝗖𝗮𝗶𝗿𝗼 𝗦𝘂𝗺𝗺𝗶𝘁 𝗥𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗮𝗹? In his article, Ali Hassan Mohamed examines the political implications of the summit involving Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea, highlighting questions surrounding President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s policy toward Ethiopia, the Nile dispute, and the strategic interests surrounding the Red Sea. 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗱 𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗳𝘂𝗹𝗹 𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗹𝘆𝘀𝗶𝘀 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗼𝘄: 📄 🧵 "What Did the Four-Way Cairo Summit Reveal? Somalia is geographically neither an upstream country from which the Nile originates nor one of the countries through which the Nile flows, such as Sudan and Egypt. Nevertheless, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed a resolution warning that the country from which the Nile originates should not take unilateral decisions, stating that such actions could have serious consequences. Ethiopia is clearly the country being warned. On the other hand, Hassan Sheikh signed a second resolution at the same venue stating that responsibility for the Red Sea rests exclusively with the countries bordering its shores (littoral countries). Once again, Ethiopia’s aspirations for access to the Red Sea were sidelined. Everyone knows that this four-way summit, organised by Egypt, represented a new alliance against Ethiopia. But the question is: Why did Somalia commit itself so firmly to such a position? When the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of Somaliland jointly signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 1 January 2024, President Hassan Sheikh personally stated that Ethiopia was Somalia’s number-one enemy. According to people close to him, Hassan Sheikh genuinely holds this view as a matter of principle and has expressed it on numerous public platforms. Whenever he gets the opportunity, he takes advantage of it to reinforce that position. Abiy Ahmed, however, changes his positions. At times, he is pressured by the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia. Those troops constitute a bargaining card that Ethiopia could use, given that they help safeguard the security of Hassan Sheikh’s government, which would struggle to govern itself without them. Yet, it appears that Ethiopia has been outmanoeuvred and made to believe that the presence of its troops in Somalia is essential to Ethiopia’s own survival. There is also the fact that Abiy Ahmed has taken Somaliland for granted, a serious miscalculation. Another interesting issue is the Red Sea. The four countries that signed the agreement stated that only countries bordering the Red Sea have the right to determine matters concerning its affairs. This raises another question: Is Israel included? We know that Israel has an important port, Eilat, in the northern part of the Red Sea, specifically on the Gulf of Aqaba. Of the four countries that met in Cairo, three recognise Israel: Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan. So, have they sidelined Ethiopia only to include Israel instead? Finally, was Hassan Sheikh’s firm stance simply a case of blindly following others, like a donkey following the herd, or did he seize the opportunity to act on his earlier declaration that “Ethiopia is Somalia’s greatest enemy”? 𝗖𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗶𝗹𝗲𝗱 𝗯𝘆 𝗠𝗼𝗵𝗮𝗺𝗲𝗱 𝗔𝗯𝗱𝗶𝗸𝗮𝗱𝗶𝗿 𝗝. 𝗛𝗮𝗺𝘂𝗱, 𝗮 𝗺𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗞𝗨𝗟𝗠𝗜𝗬𝗘 𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝗖𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗹 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗹. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗹𝘆𝘀𝗶𝘀 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝘄𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗻 𝗯𝘆 𝗛𝗼𝗻. 𝗔𝗹𝗶 𝗛𝗮𝘀𝘀𝗮𝗻 𝗠𝗼𝗵𝗮𝗺𝗲𝗱. #Somaliland #Ethiopia #Egypt #Sudan #Eritrea #CairoSummit #HornOfAfrica

Eritrea added to list of countries, including China and Russia, where US citizens are at risk of being wrongly detained, especially true for dual nationals. africa.businessinsider.com/l…

IS A NEW BLOC FORMING AGAINST ETHIOPIA? A former Somaliland minister says Egypt, Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea are increasingly lining up against Ethiopia, over both the Nile and Ethiopia’s push for access to the Red Sea.

𝗞𝗲𝘆 𝗽𝗼𝗶𝗻𝘁𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗣𝗿𝗶𝗺𝗲 𝗠𝗶𝗻𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿 @AbiyAhmedAli’𝘀 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗲𝘄 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗘𝘁𝗵𝗶𝗼𝗽𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗕𝗿𝗼𝗮𝗱𝗰𝗮𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗖𝗼𝗿𝗽𝗼𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗶𝗻 𝗧𝗶𝗴𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘆𝗮 In his interview with the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC), Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed addressed the future of the Tigray region, the TPLF, the Pretoria Peace Agreement and Ethiopia’s relations with Eritrea. Here are the key points of his message. 🔹 𝗧𝗜𝗚𝗥𝗔𝗬 𝗜𝗦 𝗕𝗜𝗚𝗚𝗘𝗥 𝗧𝗛𝗔𝗡 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗧𝗣𝗟𝗙 The Tigrayan people have existed for thousands of years, while the TPLF is a political organization of approximately 50 years. The people of Tigray will continue to exist regardless of the organization’s future. “Political organizations rise and fall, governments change, but the people and the country continue to exist.” 🔹 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗧𝗜𝗚𝗥𝗔𝗬𝗔𝗡 𝗣𝗘𝗢𝗣𝗟𝗘 𝗛𝗔𝗩𝗘 𝗣𝗔𝗜𝗗 𝗔 𝗛𝗘𝗔𝗩𝗬 𝗣𝗥𝗜𝗖𝗘 The TPLF’s policies and political outlook do not reflect the dignity and identity of the Tigrayan people. Prime Minister Abiy emphasized that the people’s existence and security must never be tied to the survival of a political organization. 🔹 𝗬𝗢𝗨𝗡𝗚 𝗣𝗘𝗢𝗣𝗟𝗘 𝗦𝗛𝗢𝗨𝗟𝗗 𝗟𝗜𝗩𝗘 𝗙𝗢𝗥 𝗧𝗛𝗘𝗜𝗥 𝗙𝗨𝗧𝗨𝗥𝗘 Prime Minister Abiy urged Tigrayan youth not to sacrifice their lives for political leaders, arguing that young people should pursue their own future and their country’s development rather than continue fighting. “Why should you die so that they can live comfortably?” He called on young people to put down their Kalashnikovs and return to education, business, agriculture and development. 🔹 𝗣𝗥𝗘𝗧𝗢𝗥𝗜𝗔 𝗠𝗨𝗦𝗧 𝗟𝗘𝗔𝗗 𝗧𝗢 𝗣𝗘𝗔𝗖𝗘, 𝗡𝗢𝗧 𝗥𝗘𝗡𝗘𝗪𝗘𝗗 𝗪𝗔𝗥 The Pretoria Agreement was intended to end hostilities, restore basic services and facilitate disarmament. Prime Minister Abiy said the TPLF had undermined this process by pursuing weapons procurement and recruiting young people by force instead of disarming. He stressed that war, particularly war fought for the interests of external forces, brings devastating consequences for Tigrayan youth and society. 🔹 𝗧𝗜𝗚𝗥𝗔𝗬 𝗠𝗨𝗦𝗧 𝗠𝗢𝗩𝗘 𝗙𝗥𝗢𝗠 𝗖𝗢𝗡𝗙𝗟𝗜𝗖𝗧 𝗧𝗢 𝗗𝗘𝗩𝗘𝗟𝗢𝗣𝗠𝗘𝗡𝗧 Prime Minister Abiy called for the Tigray region to move beyond displacement and recurring conflict toward peace, irrigation, agriculture, mining, industry and urban corridor development. He also emphasized the need for an environment in which the people of Tigray can freely choose their political direction. 🔹 𝗛𝗜𝗦𝗧𝗢𝗥𝗬 𝗜𝗦 𝗕𝗜𝗚𝗚𝗘𝗥 𝗧𝗛𝗔𝗡 𝗣𝗢𝗟𝗜𝗧𝗜𝗖𝗔𝗟 𝗢𝗥𝗚𝗔𝗡𝗜𝗭𝗔𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡𝗦 Prime Minister Abiy invoked historical figures such as Emperor Yohannes IV and Ras Alula, emphasizing Tigray’s historical contribution to Ethiopia. He said that the TPLF’s political choices and alliances contradict the historical legacy it invokes. 🔹 𝗘𝗥𝗜𝗧𝗥𝗘𝗔 𝗠𝗨𝗦𝗧 𝗖𝗛𝗢𝗢𝗦𝗘 𝗖𝗢𝗢𝗣𝗘𝗥𝗔𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡 𝗢𝗩𝗘𝗥 𝗗𝗘𝗦𝗧𝗔𝗕𝗜𝗟𝗜𝗭𝗔𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡 The Prime Minister criticized Eritrea’s ruling establishment, the PFDJ (Shaebia), for neglecting its people’s development while serving forces hostile to Ethiopia. He contrasted Eritrea’s former industrial and commercial prominence with the decline of its cities and called for peaceful relations and shared development. He warned that if Shaebia rejects the call for peace and continues on a destructive path, the consequences would be extremely severe. 🔹 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗖𝗛𝗢𝗜𝗖𝗘 𝗜𝗦 𝗕𝗘𝗧𝗪𝗘𝗘𝗡 𝗪𝗔𝗥 𝗔𝗡𝗗 𝗗𝗘𝗩𝗘𝗟𝗢𝗣𝗠𝗘𝗡𝗧 Across the interview, Prime Minister Abiy’s message was that political organizations must not place their interests above the people, young people should not be sacrificed for endless conflict, and both Tigray and the wider region should prioritize peace, cooperation and development. @AmbBirukUK @PMEthiopia @MFAEthiopia @UKinEthiopia @ebczena #Ethiopia #AbiyAhmed #EBC #Tigray #TPLF #PretoriaAgreement #Eritrea #HornOfAfrica #PeaceAndDevelopment #Medemer

Agreed. Defending Eritrea’s sovereignty is a shared responsibility that transcends political differences. A point well made by @ZecariasG.

It is a great honor to see the Eritrean Blue Revolution Front (#EBRF) featured in a news segment on Al Araby TV (@AlarabyTV). This coverage highlights EBRF’s growing international engagement, high-level relations with senior U.S. officials, and expanding global presence and organizational capacity. EBRF is positioning itself to lead Eritrea toward a new era beyond Isaias Afwerki—an era of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. The future of a free Eritrea is within reach. Watch the Al Araby TV segment @CmaDawit @EGerasouli35992 x.com/AlarabyTV/

Unmasked. Contained. The so-called operation to balkanise Ethiopia? A BIG FAIL. Eritrea’s Shabia regime is running out of options. The way forward is clear: negotiate in good faith, relinquish authoritarian rule, and open the way for a democratic transition. #EBRF

It is a great honor to see the Eritrean Blue Revolution Front (#EBRF) featured in a news segment on Al Araby TV (@AlarabyTV). This coverage highlights EBRF’s growing international engagement, high-level relations with senior U.S. officials, and expanding global presence and organizational capacity. EBRF is positioning itself to lead Eritrea toward a new era beyond Isaias Afwerki—an era of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. The future of a free Eritrea is within reach. Watch the Al Araby TV segment @CmaDawit @EGerasouli35992 x.com/AlarabyTV/