In April, I asked U.S. officials what a first concrete step towards multilateral nuclear talks would be.
The response: “We’re not in negotiations right now. We’re in exploratory discussions.”
Five months later, what has changed?
I appreciate
@RobbieGramer and
@MGordonWSJ pursuing this story on the CTBT’s 30th anniversary and ahead of renewed P5 talks after a much-needed break following what was an exhausting NPT Review Conference. But the
@WSJ report leaves key questions unanswered about how substantive and reciprocal these U.S.–China exchanges actually are.
Having followed the P5 Process for years and participated in both P5-mandated and bilateral U.S.–China Track 2 dialogues, I welcome sustained engagement at both levels. The U.S. and China have been discussing their nuclear doctrines and, more recently, specific risk-reduction measures within the P5 for years. The question is what these reported bilateral exchanges add.
Has Beijing agreed to a substantive bilateral agenda on testing? Within the P5, has consensus been reached on discussing testing concerns and related confidence-building measures in their agenda moving forward? Are reciprocal proposals being developed? What is Washington prepared to offer and accept itself?
Washington has been pressing its testing allegations while encouraging dialogue for months. The U.S., UK and France publicly called in May for confidence-building measures on nuclear explosive test monitoring, alongside a ballistic missile and space launch notification mechanism. What remains unclear is whether these efforts have secured agreement on a process for developing such measures.
Confidential diplomacy deserves room to work. Exploratory exchanges can be valuable in their own right. But readers need enough substance to assess whether continued contact is producing diplomatic momentum. The report gives us too little to make that judgment.
As I argued in
@ForeignPolicy last October (
foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/30…), ambiguity over Washington’s own testing intentions carries serious risks. Leaving other governments guessing can fuel the miscalculation and reciprocal escalation these discussions should help prevent. Has Washington clarified to Beijing what Trump’s testing directive means in practice? Has the administration even settled that question internally almost a year later?
I also warned last October that China could benefit most from a return to explosive testing. Washington should explain how reopening that competition would serve American security, given its success in maintaining confidence in its arsenal without nuclear detonations for decades.
There is a real opportunity to strengthen confidence in the testing moratoria through technical clarification, reciprocal transparency and sustained expert engagement. I want these discussions to succeed, but Washington needs to explain how threatening to resume nuclear explosive testing helps preserve the restraint it is asking others to demonstrate.
Exclusive: The Trump administration has been quietly holding talks with China about its rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal amid doubts over Beijing’s compliance with a 30-year test ban, U.S. officials said.