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renvoue. 🟥🟨🟦 retweeted
这位朋友也在“抄底”：3 小时前以 $2,582 买入 1,470.94 枚 $ETH，花费 380.3 万枚 USDC👀
钱包地址 explorer.cow.fi/orders/0xfb0…
#Bitget 来了就是VIP！Crypto、美股、CFD，全球先机一站布局
假期结束了，币价也瀑布了😅
不过这行情每次暴跌都不缺“抄底”的：地址 0x6f4…52F67 过去 2 小时从 #Binance 提出 3583.2 枚 $ETH，价值 927 万美元，提出均价 $2587.32，他已通过两次中转将所有代币转移至新地址 0x991…4fa70
钱包地址 arkm.com/explorer/address/0x…
#Bitget 来了就是VIP！Crypto、美股、CFD，全球先机一站布局
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renvoue. 🟥🟨🟦 retweeted
L2s are shutting down because being useful requires costly integrations: oracles, liquidity, stablecoins…
With EEZ, everything on Ethereum is also available on your L2 out of the box - so L2s can focus on their core business!
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Vitalik: AI is becoming the new UI.
Agents won’t click.
They’ll just state outcomes.
Intents were built for this exact moment.
Vitalik: AI Will Become the New UI
On October 6, 2026, Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin @VitalikButerin said at OKX NOW @okx in Singapore that AI will become the new user interface in more and more scenarios. He shared how a local AI agent wrote a script to update his ENS hash in about five minutes, and said performing complex blockchain operations without a traditional UI will become normal.
This could reduce security risks associated with traditional frontends, while introducing new challenges such as prompt injection, AI safety, and whether agents correctly understand onchain operations.
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Just use CoW Swap – where even if solvers get sandwiched, users don't: swap.cow.fi 🐮
> For users, actionable steps include:
> checking undocumented implementation details of your wallet
> understanding complex trade-offs
> applying advanced slippage limits
Or you can just use @CoWSwap where professional solvers bear the risk and cost of getting sandwiched.
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renvoue. 🟥🟨🟦 retweeted
> For users, actionable steps include:
> checking undocumented implementation details of your wallet
> understanding complex trade-offs
> applying advanced slippage limits
Or you can just use @CoWSwap where professional solvers bear the risk and cost of getting sandwiched.
Your MEV protection may not work as you expect. We discuss our latest paper on protected order flow sandwich attacks and release an explorer to check if your protected transaction was sandwiched, and how.
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CoW Swap *often* gives you more than you ask for. 🐮
dune.com/queries/8886072/129… shows quote deviation for CoW Swap (Mainnet) in September. Median as well as vol weighted mean is positive for all trade size buckets.
Most "classic" aggregators eat 100% of positive slippage so you never get more than quoted.
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renvoue. 🟥🟨🟦 retweeted
Our September update is out.
September brought a lot of movement: auditors reading the contracts, @Nethermind building an EEZ client, and a @CoWSwap order settling across chains on our experimental network.
Read the full update ↓
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renvoue. 🟥🟨🟦 retweeted
EXCITING!
what stood out to me this month is how much of EEZ is now being tested by people other than us: Nethermind is building a client for it, and a CoW Swap order has settled across chains on our experimental network.
Next is the audit, which the TheDAO grant is meant to fund. 🫡
Our September update is out.
September brought a lot of movement: auditors reading the contracts, @Nethermind building an EEZ client, and a @CoWSwap order settling across chains on our experimental network.
Read the full update ↓
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renvoue. 🟥🟨🟦 retweeted
Following an investigation into an infrastructure compromise, MetaMask Staking (ex Consensys Staking) has taken precautionary steps to protect client assets related to its operated Ethereum validators.
These steps include exiting its Ethereum (ETH) validators in the Lido protocol, and will likely incur foregone rewards as well as possible downtime penalties should validators be taken offline in the near future to reduce risks related to potential network penalties. Relevant validators have begun the exit process, with the final validators expected to be exited (but not fully withdrawn) by the end of October 7th, 2026.
No action is required from stETH holders. ETH exited from MetaMask Staking-operated validators is expected to return to the protocol gradually as the relevant validators complete the exit, withdrawal, and re-entry cycle, which is estimated to take approximately up to 45 days due to the extended entry queue. As a reminder, staking operations are non-custodial in nature and MetaMask does not manage withdrawal keys for staking on behalf of clients.
As always, the Lido Protocol’s diverse Node Operator set and other security systems including the ad hoc reserve fund (of over 6,750 stETH), are designed to contain and mitigate disruptions to the normal operations of the protocol, in addition to other potential routes.
research.lido.fi/t/security-…
A full investigation is underway, and further updates will be shared as they become available. For further details, please refer to the MetaMask Staking release linked below.
Security Update: We are responding to a security incident affecting part of our infrastructure.
At this time, we have identified no immediate threat to MetaMask wallets.
As a precaution, we are proactively exiting affected validators within our non-custodial staking operations, in coordination with clients, partners and security advisors.
We’ll share further updates as appropriate. metamask.io/news/user-update…
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renvoue. 🟥🟨🟦 retweeted
Disappointed by the European Central Bank’s (ECB) and European Banking Authority’s (EBA) responses to the MiCA consultation.
They are not only advocating for a prohibition on paying yield on stablecoins, but also for restrictions on CASPs providing access to DeFi, including protocols offering yield on non-MiCA-authorized stablecoins, without providing a clear framework for how access to DeFi should work in practice.
They also suggest that CASPs offering access to DeFi should restrict it to certain groups of users through so-called “suitability tests,” alongside a potential certification regime for DeFi lending protocols.
It is unclear how these requirements would work in practice. If regulators determine which protocols are deemed suitable for European users, the result risks looking very different from the open DeFi that exists today.
Instead, we could end up with more walled gardens that undermine the liquidity and network effects of open financial networks, ultimately limiting Europeans’ ability to access new ways to grow and preserve wealth.
These proposals are presented as measures to “protect consumers.” But excessive restrictions can instead create more friction for innovation and slow the development of open, transparent, and auditable financial infrastructure that can benefit consumers.
The reality is that onchain finance, including stablecoins, DeFi, and tokenized securities, has the potential to reshape financial infrastructure by reducing friction, increasing transparency, and expanding access to financial opportunities.
European consumers and businesses stand to benefit significantly from this transformation, particularly if the companies building this infrastructure can continue to build and compete from within Europe.
Meanwhile, U.S. regulators, including the SEC and CFTC, have increasingly taken a more pragmatic approach toward enabling onchain financial innovation.
European regulators should put users and their interests at the center of the framework. Banks and other incumbents should be able to adapt their businesses to serve users in an increasingly onchain economy, rather than relying on artificial restrictions that risk increasing costs and reducing access for Europeans as the rest of the world moves onchain.
DeFi will win.
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renvoue. 🟥🟨🟦 retweeted
ens.eth(@ensdomains) sold another 1,097 $ETH ($3M) at $2,743 4 hours ago.
arkm.com/explorer/entity/ens
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renvoue. 🟥🟨🟦 retweeted
Monthly DEX aggregator volume across all vendors and all chains is roughly 50% down in 2026 compared to 2025. What needs to happen to reverse that trend?
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renvoue. 🟥🟨🟦 retweeted
Yes, but:
1) Anyone who ever feels wronged by Near intents could now sue them. There is clear precedence that they have both the ability and the desire to decide what’s a good transaction and what’s a bad one. This will happen.
2) Any judge, law enforcement official, or prosecutor who wants to go after Near Intents (or its governors and participants) for facilitating illicit use can do so and accuse them of conspiracy or aiding and abetting. This will happen. (They went after Roman for a system he didn’t even control)
3) Any government that imposes sanctions will now expect near intents to enforce them. This will happen.
4) Any hacker (enabled by a frontier model) can now target Near Intents as it has demonstrated centralized controls.
You could argue all of this is tolerable or even “worth it”. That’s a reasonable argument. But why bother with the decentralization theater? Just build a fully permissioned system and do KYC.
No such thing as a system that’s only trustless when things go well.
In the last 48 hours, @near_intents:
> Detected and blocked stolen funds from an exchange hack
> Got exploited, patched within hours. $3.8M lost, all being refunded
CEX hacks (~$5B) and bridge exploits (~$3.7B) have been the two worst loss vectors in crypto.
Refreshing to see a team take ownership of crypto's biggest weakness.
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Token Transparency Filing. ✅
Zero gaps: blockworks.com/token-transpa…
Thanks @Blockworks 🙏
CoW Protocol lets you trade ERC-20s onchain without getting MEV'd. You sign an intent, solvers compete to fill it, and surplus flows back to you.
CoW just refiled its B2 Token Transparency Filing with zero gaps.
$COW live since February 2022.
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renvoue. 🟥🟨🟦 retweeted
General Manager of Near Intents won't add Monero, calling it “very dirty liquidity”
Yesterday, part of the Bitget hacked funds were entered into the shielded $ZEC pool x.com/coinbureau/status/2105…
Now that Zcash provably contains dirty funds, will @near_intents delist it?
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renvoue. 🟥🟨🟦 retweeted
PropAMMs beat passive LPs by leveraging capabilities like active repricing and pricing by counterparty. That edge lets them quote retail tighter. But propAMMs also spoof quotes.
On-chain routing fixes that, and MRC-17 makes it simpler with one shared routing interface for propAMMs.
🚨 New paper alert 🚨
Active Liquidity On Chain: Evidence from PropAMMs Across Chains
w/ Ozan Solmaz @jason_of_cs
Liquidity providers on traditional AMMs such as Uniswap are passive and suffer from adverse selection. As a result, their price only moves through trades. When an external market moves, these LPs get picked off on their stale quotes. PropAMMs, a new design, emerged in 2024 attempting to combat this. In them, a single operator quotes from its own inventory and reprices actively. By 2026, propAMMs carried more than half of SOL/USDC volume on Solana and had been found, among other chains, on Base and Monad.
Our work seeks to elucidate the benefits of this new design both for LPs and for retail users. Do propAMM operators really have an edge over passive LPs, and if so, where does this edge come from? Can propAMMs offer tighter quotes to retail users? We measured a full year of propAMMs on Solana, Base and Monad, and decoded the closed-source on-chain logic of Tessera, the largest propAMM on Base.
The result: propAMMs have a measurable edge over passive LPs: two seconds after a fill, propAMMs earn 0.37 bps on Solana, 1.19 bps on Base and 1.69 bps on Monad, while passive LPs on AMMs comparatively lose 0.22, 0.62 and 2.06 bps. We trace the edge to four sources:
🟠 Cheap, frequent repricing: updates use at least 25 times less resources than swaps on Solana, and 5 to 15 times less on Base and Monad. Generally, the default block order on all three chains is by priority fee per unit of computation. Thus, an update pays far less than a swap for the same priority placement.
🟠 Pricing by counterparty: five of the six largest Solana propAMMs offer tighter spreads to aggregator flow than to non-aggregator flow. For Tessera on Base, we show that it whitelists, penalizes or blacklists individual addresses.
🟠 Arbitrage against AMMs: when a reference price moves, propAMMs reprice while AMMs do not, and arbitrageurs trade the two. A propAMM fills at its updated quote, so it may break even on these legs on Solana and Base and even earn 1.55 bps on Monad.
🟠 Spoofing: aggregators route on the quote from the end of the previous block. For Tessera on Base, we show that the operator consistently raises its default fee early in the block and lowers it again late in the block, so aggregators read stale state that carries the lower fee. As a result, only 39% of swaps execute at the quoted price, and the average swap receives 1.08 bps less.
The second question we ask is: can propAMMs offer users tighter quotes as a result of their edge? The answer is yes: on fills that arrive while the price is not moving (our proxy for retail flow) propAMMs take 0.26 bps on Solana, 1.26 bps on Base and 1.62 bps on Monad, where AMMs take 2.59, 1.38 and 8.60 bps respectively. Retail also makes up a larger share of propAMM volume: 32%, 43% and 17% on Solana, Base and Monad, against 9%, 16% and 8% on AMMs.
What did we learn? PropAMMs avoid the losses of passive liquidity provision, yet still manage to give retail tighter quotes. However, users also have to bear the cost of spoofing, which we expect to change as aggregators move to an on-chain methodology.
Link: arxiv.org/abs/2609.38056
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