The US and China have launched an AI dialogue. This is a good initial step, and I am glad to see no linkage to export controls, but questions remain. The US public discussion is about some kind of coordinated slowdown so safety can catch up. We are a long way from unilateral parallel safeguards, let alone a negotiated slowdown.
Four questions:
First, Treasury and USTR led the talks and met with Vice Premier He Lifeng. That is a good way to create initial support for a leader-level summit deliverable but the path to actual progress on AI safety requires work to be done by different ministries and agencies. Were those agencies and ministries involved, and will they be brought in?
Second, even if the answer is nominally yes, it may be practically no. On the Chinese side, what role will MOST, MIIT, CAC, MOFCOM, MSS, MOJ, NDRC, and others actually play? When we negotiated the US-China AI Dialogue in 2023 as a summit deliverable, we focused heavily on participation. When the dialogue happened the next year, those in the room reported that the PRC side didn’t send the right people and the ones they did send didn’t speak up. Granted, this was a first step, but that left the exercise thin.
Third, the lowest hanging fruit is unilateral but coordinated parallel regulation — something that would mean adopting similar safeguards. Did this discussion indicate any interest in pursuing this approach? China will not take steps if it feels the US deregulatory approach to AI is here to stay. And the President has been less amenable to safety.
Fourth, will the announced crisis mechanism work? A crisis line only works if someone picks up the phone, and the current mechanisms with China — to be blunt — do not work and did not work during past crises (EP-3, balloon). It’s also not clear which ministry on the Chinese side will pick up. It probably should be kept in a party body rather than a state body if we want it to be used, but that too is no assurance.
None of this is to say the dialogue we’ve seen is hopeless or futile, but this is the easy part, and progress will be hard. The key is probably to focus less on the “theory” of dialogue and more on its hard translation into diplomatic “practice” and actual governance in our respective systems.
Maybe more will be announced at the summit itself. For now, these questions are fundamental.